

T H E 1493. p. 6. 11

POLITICKS

On BOTH SIDES,

With REGARD to
FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Stated from their own WRITINGS, and
examined by the Course of EVENTS.

With some OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
PRESENT STATE of AFFAIRS
IN
GREAT BRITAIN,

And the Effects of our NEGOTIA-
TIONS for several Years past.

Juxta se posita magis elucescunt.

L O N D O N.

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POLITICS

ON BOARDS



FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AND THE STATE OF THE

EMPIRE

OF THE

RESISTANCE OF A NATION

IN


GREY BRITAIN

AND THE EFFECTS OF OUR

RELATIONS TO THE



T H E
POLITICKS *on both Sides,*
With REGARD to
Foreign Affairs, &c.

“  H E whole Face of Affairs in
“ *Europe* is, within the Space of
“ the last Year, so much altered,
“ that it is almost impossible for
“ the most unconcern'd Spectator
“ to prevent his Thoughts from
“ running out into Questions and
“ Suppositions about it. *Curiosity* itself, the low-
“ est Principle of all our Enquiries, will force its
“ Way into such a Scene ; and will expect, or in-
“ vent, some Account of so surprizing a Change
“ from a CALM, hardly parallel'd by any PAST PRO-
“ SPECT, to a sudden Gathering of CLOUDS ; which,
“ if not soon dissipated, must burst and discharge
“ Themselves somewhere or other.
“ But when *Self-Interest* is join'd to this *natural*
“ *Curiosity*, and it becomes a *personal* and *national*
“ Concern to know the main Causes and Springs of
“ *such*

“ *such Events* as all are interested in, there seems
 “ then to be a *RIGHT*, strictly so called, to demand
 “ and receive all the Satisfaction the Nature of
 “ such Affairs can permit to be given. In a *free Na-*
 “ *tion* especially, where no Resolutions can be effect-
 “ al without the Consent and Support of the Com-
 “ munity, every Man, who can think at all, will
 “ think it an *injurious Treatment*, if, at a proper
 “ Time and in a proper Manner, *some Light* be not
 “ *hold-forth to them*, and some satisfactory Solution
 “ given of *such Appearances*, as must otherwise very
 “ much perplex and disturb Him.

I choose to begin this Discourse in the very same
 Words with the Author of the * *ENQUIRY*, about
 seven Years ago; not only because the present State
 of Affairs in *Europe* seems to be as like the State of
 Affairs at that Time, as two Conjunctions can pos-
 sibly resemble each other; but likewise for a Justifi-
 cation of the *present Enquiry*, to which I think my-
 self equally intitled, though perhaps not so well in-
 structed as *that Writer*; and “† every *Briton*, who,
 “ either by his Treasure or his Blood, by his Vote
 “ or his Interest, by his Person or his Representa-
 “ tive, hath, in Time past, born any Part in procur-
 “ ing the *common Peace*, and establishing the several
 “ Interests of *Europe*; every such Member of the
 “ *British Nation*, who, by *this Time* flattered Him-
 “ self with Hopes of enjoying the Result of all his
 “ *Toil, and Taxes, and Blood, in an universal Peace,*
 “ and an *extended undisturb'd Commerce*, hath a
 “ Right to ask — *How comes this Face of Things*
 “ *to be again overclouded?* — *All Europe once more*
 “ *in Agitation!*

It



* See *An Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of*
Great Britain, &c. p. 3.

† *Ib.* p. 4.

It is not improbable that *Those*, * in whose Time of Power such a Crisis of political Affairs appears in the World, may ascribe it intirely to an Event which no human Wisdom could possibly foresee; I mean, the Death of the late King of Poland; but whether it is really owing to *that Incident*, or to some *other Causes* more remote, shall be the Business of our present Enquiry.

When I first took the Resolution of writing upon this Subject, I propos'd, for the Sake of Impartiality, not only to state the *Politicks on both Sides from their own Writings*, but to place their respective Arguments upon every material Topick of Debate, for several Years past, in opposite Columns, and in their own Words; with no farther Remarks upon them than what should be just necessary to connect them together, and make them generally understood. This, no Doubt, would have been the most effectual Way to obviate the common Complaints against *political Writers*, and to purge myself from the Imputation of designing to misrepresent the Arguments on *either Side*, or to draw false Conclusions from them: But, upon Trial, I found the Reasoning of *some Writers*, whom I am oblig'd to quote, so very diffus'd, and scatter'd up and down in several Parts of the *same Book*, or reiterated with frequent Variations in *others*, according to the different Circumstances of Affairs, that I could not put my first Design in Execution, without swelling *this Treatise* to a much larger Bulk, than would be either proper or agreeable upon such an Occasion. I was therefore oblig'd to take a shorter Method, by collecting their Sense together, and reducing their Arguments, upon several Points, into Propositions; with marginal References to the *Writers Themselves*. As I choose this Method for the Reader's Ease more than

than my own, so I assure the Publick, that where-
 ever I find myself under this Necessity of abridging
 the Arguments on *either Side*, I will do it with the
 utmost Exactness and Fidelity, as far as I under-
 stand them my self; and tho it may be soon per-
 ceived to *which Side* I am inclined, I shall scorn to
 attempt any mean Triumph over the *other*, or to
 impose on the World by any wilful Misrepresentation;
 for I think it not only an unfair, but a most
 ridiculous Way of writing, upon any disputable, or
 disputed Subject, to wrest the Words of an *Adver-*
sary, or the Measures upon which they are found-
 ed, to any Meaning or Consequences which do
 not naturally result from them. Such Artifices as
 These may impose upon Persons unacquainted
 with the Point in Debate, and serve the little Pur-
 poses of a *temporary Expedient*, but will always re-
 coil at last upon *Those* who make Use of them, and
 do most Hurt to *that Cause* which they are calcula-
 ted to promote.

This being premised, as the Rule of my own
 Conduct in the present Enquiry, I shall now pro-
 ceed to a cursory View of the principal Transacti-
 ons for several Years past, and the Sentiments of
both Parties upon them, as they appear in their Writ-
 ings; with some Observations on the Course of
Events, as the surest Guides to us for discovering
 the true Causes of the present Commotions in *Eu-*
rope.

It is acknowledged, on *both Sides*, that all our
 late *Negotiations* and *Expedients*, to preserve the
 publick Tranquillity, were occasioned by the first
 Treaty of *Vienna*, and the Counter-Alliance of
Hanover, which succeeded it; for his late Majesty
 was pleased to assure us from the Throne, in the
 Year 1724. *that we had Peace with ALL POWERS a-*
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broad; but we had scarce Time to congratulate ourselves on this happy Situation of Affairs, before the whole Scene was again embroiled, as the *Enquirer* most pathetically complains in the Passages before cited. The chief Point therefore in Dispute at that Time was, to what Causes so sudden, and, as it was called, so *unaccountable*, a *Conjunction* was really owing. The *Court-Writers*, as well as their *Patrons*, imputed it, in the most peremptory Manner, to the dangerous Designs of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, against the Liberties of *Europe* in general, as well as the most valuable Interests of *Great Britain* in particular. The *Writers on the other Side* seemed to look upon it only as a *defensive Treaty* between two Nations, whose Interest it was to ally themselves to each other at that particular Juncture. This Point was fully canvassed about Five Years ago, by * a Gentleman who wrote under the Name of JOHN TROT, and the Author of the *Enquiry*; in the Course of which Debate, I think, it was indubitably proved, that the Prospect of the *Infanta's* being sent back from *France*, after the Duke of *Orleans's* Death, induced the Court of *Spain* to begin the Negotiation with the *Emperor*; and that her being actually sent back, with our *Refusal of the sole Mediation*, determined his *Catholick Majesty* to put a finishing Hand to *that Treaty*. To this it was added, that our *Refusal to restore Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, in Pursuance of a *Promise*, as They pretended, founded on a *LETTER* from his late Majesty to the King of *Spain*, might be another Motive to such a Resolution at the Court of *Madrid*; for though the very Existence

* See *Trot's Second Letter to the Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 74. *Defence of the Enquiry*, p. 14. *John Trot's Third Letter to the Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 272.

Existence of any such Letter was at first strenuously denied, a Copy of it hath been since produced in both Houses of Parliament, and if it does not contain an *absolute Promise*, yet it furnishes them with a Pretension, at least, to found such a Claim upon it. It was likewise suggested, not without some Grounds, that our concluding a *private Treaty* at *Madrid*, in the Year 1721. whilst We were Mediators between *Spain* and the *Emperor*, gave such an Umbrage at the Court of *Vienna*, as helped to pave the Way to a Reconciliation between *those two Powers*; one of whom had received a very great Indignity from the Court of *France*, and the other not a little displeased with That of *Great Britain* upon the Account before mentioned: It deserves a Remark in this Place, that *Spain* depended upon *France* as her Friend at the Congress, and the *Emperor* looked upon *Great Britain* in the same Light; but *both Parties* being thus disobliged by the *respective Mediators*, on whom they rely'd, it became almost necessary for the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* to contrive some Method of reconciling themselves. This seems, at least, a plausible Reason for * two Powers, that could hardly be kept within the Bounds of common Decency towards one another, by all the Address of *two powerful Mediators* in a publick Treaty, abandoning *that Mediation*, and, in the Middle of it, privately running into one another's Arms, with all the Marks of cordial Affection and a resolute Friendship.

But whatever might be the true Grounds of this sudden Revolution of Counsels and Dispositions in the *two Courts*, it is certain, that the Treaty of *Vienna*,

enna, and the Measures taken in Opposition to it; laid the Foundation of that long Series of Negotiations, Conventions, and Projects of Accommodation, which engross'd all our Attention for several Years together. Let us therefore review the Conduct of both Parties upon this Occasion.

Now, if the Treaty of *Vienna* contain'd nothing but an Accommodation of Differences between the two Courts, with the usual Stipulations of *Peace, Commerce and mutual Defence*, (as the contracting Parties declared) We had no Occasion to take such an Alarm, or to be in such a Hurry of putting ourselves in a Posture of Defence. We ought rather to have rejoiced that *these Powers* had found out a Method of adjusting their own Differences, after We had attempted it in vain ; since nothing else was wanting at that Time, as we have been often told, to complete the general Repose and Tranquillity of *Europe*. Nay, it would certainly have been our Interest, in such a Case, to accede to *that Treaty*, as We were invited to do, instead of entertaining such terrible Apprehensions from it, and taking such extraordinary Measures to defeat it.

But it must be confess'd, at the same Time, that if the Allies of *Vienna* had really entred into any such dangerous Engagements as our *Politicians* apprehended, and their *Advocates* positively asserted, it was certainly their Duty to oppose them with the utmost Vigour.

For this Reason, the *Author of the Enquiry* made it his chief Business to prove, that there was a *secret offensive Treaty* between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, besides those publick ones of *Peace and Commerce* which They had communicated to the World. Nay, He pretended to be so well informed of *this Fact*, that He gave us the particular Articles of it,

viz. ' 1. † That the *Emperor* was to assist *Spain*, in
 ' obtaining *Gibraltar* by Force. 2. That *Spain* was
 ' to support the *Emperor* in his new Establishment
 ' of the *Ostend Company*. For both which Purposes,
 ' as he told us, the Quota's of Money on one Side,
 ' and of *Soldiers* on the other, were actually settled.
 ' 3. That the two Courts had undertaken to place the
 ' Pretender on the Throne of *Great Britain*; and
 ' to begin with that Enterprize before They pro-
 ' ceeded to put their other Projects in Execution.'
 These were Points which particularly affected *Great*
Britain in her tenderest Concerns. But the same
 Author likewise discovered another Article in this se-
 cret offensive Treaty, which had the same bad Aspect
 upon all *Europe*, and threatned Her with universal
 Monarchy; '* I mean, says He, the Marriages of
 ' the two Arch-Duchesses, Daughters to the present
 ' Emperor, with the two Infants of *Spain*, Sons to
 ' the King by the present Queen.' He then observes,
 ' that such an Alliance must constitute a Power in
 ' one Family, beyond all that We have known,
 ' formidable and irresistible.' In another Place, he
 leaves us to judge, ' † whether ever hitherto any one
 ' Scheme hath appeared in *Europe*, of a Destruction
 ' so universal, and of a Ruin so extended, as This
 ' appears plainly to be.

It was indeed alledged, that, even in the publick
 Treaty of *Vienna*, greater Privileges in Commerce were
 granted to the ‡ Emperor's Subjects than to those of
Great Britain. But the Falshood of this Assertion
 appeared very plainly from the Treaty itself, which
 puts them only on the same Foot with the most fa-
 voured Nations; and *Great Britain* having long been
 in

† Enquiry, p. 34.
 ‡ Ib. p. 62.

* Ib. p. 86.

† Ib. p. 91.

in that Number, whatever Privileges of Trade any other Nation may obtain from his *Catholick Majesty*, must be conceded to Us, at the same Time, by virtue of former Treaties. Besides, the King of Spain immediately disown'd any such Design by his Ministers, and afterwards in a formal Article of a Treaty; which is so remarkable, that I cannot forbear quoting it.

* *The Ministers of his Britannick Majesty*, and of his most Christian Majesty, having PRETENDED, that in the Treaties concluded at Vienna, between the Emperor and the King of Spain, in the Year 1725. there were divers Clauses that infringed the Articles of the several Treaties of Commerce, or of the Treaties of Peace, in which Commerce may be concerned, antecedent to the Year 1725. his *Catholick Majesty* hath declared, as He declares by the present Article, that he never MEANT to grant, nor will suffer to subsist, by virtue of the said Treaties of Vienna, any Privilege contrary to the Treaties here above confirmed.

It was likewise affirmed, that the *Emperor's Minister* had acknowledged some Engagement with Spain relating to Gibraltar; but it appears, from the † *Enquiry* itself, that his *Imperial Majesty* entred into this Engagement upon the Representation of the Court of Spain, that there remain'd still some Things to regulate between his *Catholick Majesty* and the King of Great Britain; in which it is probable, that the Court of Spain might include the famous Letter of 1721. upon which they founded their Pretensions and Demand of Gibraltar; but the *Emperor* would engage no farther, than to employ his *Mediation* between Them, under

* See the Treaty of Seville, in the original French, Art. 3. † lb. p. 21.

under these Restrictions, that the Points in Dispute had any Relation to the Treaty of London, or arose in Consequence of that Treaty; nor even then, unless it should prove agreeable to his Britannick Majesty.——

In another Part of the same Book, it appears, * that a NOBLE PERSON in an high Station, having publicly declared it in the House of Lords, as an undoubted Truth, that there was a secret offensive Alliance between the Emperor and Spain, which contain'd Articles in it destructive to the Rights of Britain, both with Regard to its Possessions and its Commerce abroad; the Imperial Resident here was order'd to give Satisfaction to the British Court, upon this Subject, by producing the Article, which his Master had entred into, relating to GIBRALTAR; and this Article implied no more, than that his Imperial Majesty had engaged to use his good Offices, if it should be agreeable to his Britannick Majesty, as his Minister had before declared. But all these Assurances were far from giving our Politicians, or their Advocate the Enquirer, any Satisfaction that there was no such Engagement, though the Event hath sufficiently shew'd, that the Emperor never gave his Catholick Majesty the least Assistance towards the Recovery of that Place, whilst it was besieg'd, nor at any other Time, during our long Misunderstanding with those Courts.

As for the OSTEND COMPANY, it was always treated as a Point of so little Consequence to our essential Interests, on † one Side, and hath since been declared so by the ‡ other, that I shall not detain the Reader with any particular Detail of the Controversies about it. But it may not be amiss, just to take Notice,

* P. 35 † See the *Craftsman*, Vol. 1. p. 222. ‡ See the *London Journal*, Dec. 21. 1728. or, the *Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 84.

Notice, as we pass along, that *this Company* hath accidentally proved^e of great Detriment to us, not only by contributing to the late Disturbances in *Europe*, but likewise by putting all Countries upon Projects of the same Kind; and though his *Imperial Majesty* hath at length consented to the Abolition of the *Company* at *Ostend*, He is far from having given up all Thoughts of the *Trade*, being now carrying on a Negotiation at *Lisbon* for that Purpose.

Let us therefore return to the *secret offensive Treaty*; by which the two Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, as the *Enquirer* asserted, had not only entred into the strongest Engagements upon all *these Points*, but likewise to place the *Pretender* upon the Throne of *Great Britain*. This was, indeed, an alarming Consideration, and what might justly provoke the Resentments of a free People; especially when They were assured, in the most authoritative Manner, 'that * the *British* Court had positive Intelligence, and Intelligence from more than one Person, and such as could be intirely depended on, that one express Article of *this Alliance* between the *Emperor* and *Spain* contain'd an Obligation in Favour of the *PRETENDER*, and a Stipulation to make the Attempt for Him in *England*, before opening the War in any other Parts.' — It is no Wonder, I say, that the Passions of the People were inflamed by such Declarations as These, and broke out into the warmest Addresses against *those Powers*, whom They supposed to be engaged in such destructive Measures. Some of Them were so very zealous, upon this Occasion, that They not only express'd their cheerful Acquiescence under a Land-Tax of † *four Shillings in the Pound*, but made a voluntary Offer of the other sixteen,

* *Enquiry*, p. 52. † *Tothest Address*.

fixteen, and of every Thing else that is dear and valuable to Them.

Here likewise I must repeat my Acknowledgment, that if the Intelligence of *such a Design* was well founded, our *Ministers* were not only fully justify'd in all their Precautions to defeat it, but would have been justify'd in much farther Lengths than They thought fit to go. But when all this *positive Intelligence*, *convincing Evidence*, and *pretended Certainty*, appeared to be founded only on **SUSPICIONS*, or *something more than SUSPICIONS*, *built upon APPEARANCES*; or, at best, when the whole Evidence, as †*another Writer* sums it up, consisted in nothing but *Wharton's Rambles*, *Ripperda's Chit-chat*, *Hear-says of what one great Man writ, concerning what another great Man said*; *three Muscovite Ships coming to Spain*; *Embarkations which were never made*, and *Armies which were never assembled*. When This, I say, appeared to be the Case, many Persons were inclined to suspend their Belief of any *such Design*, till They saw it a little more authentically proved; especially, since his *Imperial Majesty* thought fit to disown it by his *Minister* here, in the most solemn Manner; which He had no Occasion to do, if he was really grown so inveterate against his *Britannick Majesty* as the *Court-Writers* represented him. Nay, I have been informed, upon pretty good Authority, that long before Mr. *Palm's Memorial*, or the *Enquiry* was published, his *Imperial Majesty* took an Opportunity of declaring, upon the Faith of a *Christian*, and the Word of an *Emperor*, that He was so far from having enter'd into any Measures for placing the *Pretender* on the *British Throne*, that no such Overtures had been made to Him. If This should be true, as I hope it is not, what

* *Enquiry*, p. 33. † *Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 257.

what shall we say to *those Men* who inflamed the Nation to such an Height, upon this Account, and — Let Them read their own Article of Impeachment against the late Earl of Oxford, for *corrupting the Fountain of Truth, and putting Falshoods into the Mouth of Majesty.*

Her *Czarish Majesty* likewise purged Herself from the same Charge, by a solemn Declaration, * That she had never enter'd into any Engagements with the Pretender against his *Britannick Majesty*, and that she look'd upon all such Reports as mere Calumnies, spread abroad by the *English Ministers* in order to justify their Measures at Home, and prejudice foreign Courts against Her.

The Gentlemen on the *Country Side* were therefore justify'd, as far as *Events* could justify them, in their Backwardness to believe any *such Design*; for from that Time to this there hath not been any Attempt, nor any Appearance of an Attempt, in Favour of the Pretender. Nay, even the *Court Writers* themselves seem'd to be ashamed of this Argument a Year or two after, when all their *positive* and *undoubted Intelligence* dwindled away to † APPREHENSIONS ONLY, that there might be Engagements in Favour of the Pretender. I believe They have since made a Discovery that even their *Apprehensions* were groundless, and that there never were any *such Engagements*, either *ostensible*, or *non-ostensible*.

However, these Alarms had such an Effect, at that Time, on the Minds of *some Men*, that instead of advising his Majesty to accede to the *Vienna Treaty*, under any Conditions, They thought it immediately necessary

* *Roussel*, Vol. 4. p. 222.

† *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, &c.* printed for Roberts in the Year 1729. p. 49. *Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 245.

necessary to project a *Counter-Alliance*; which was concluded at *Hanover* soon after, and laid the Foundation of fresh Disputes, both at Home and Abroad.

The first contracting Parties in *this Treaty*, were the Crowns of *Great Britain*, *France* and *Prussia*, who invited the *States General*, by an express Article, to accede to it, and agreed to invite others. But the *Dutch*, who had this particular Compliment paid Them in the *Treaty* itself, did not accede to it, till about eleven Months after it had been sign'd at *Hanover*, and even then under * *very large Restrictions*.

About the same Time, his Majesty of *Prussia* took an Opportunity of detaching himself from *this Alliance*, in which he was an original Party. Whether this Division was occasion'd by the Affair of *Thorn*, which was suffer'd to die away as soon as the *Treaty* was made, or by any other Causes, I cannot say; but every good Protestant must lament any Misunderstandings between two Crowns which are so nearly ally'd as those of *Great Britain* and *Prussia*.

However, to compensate this Loss of one Ally, We soon gain'd another in the King and Kingdom of *Sweden*, who acceded to this *Treaty* under certain † Modifications and Restrictions, by the persuasive Eloquence of Count *Horn*, who acquainted the States, ‡ *that the Treaty of HANOVER did not lay Them under so many Obligations as FORMER TREATIES*; though They were to receive a Subsidy of *fifty thousand Pounds a Year*, for *three Years*, both from *England* and *France*, as the Price of their Accession.

The King of *Denmark* was afterwards prevail'd upon to follow the same Example, in Consideration of a *large Subsidy* for four Years, and other Stipulations

* *General Collection of Treaties, &c.* printed for Knapp-
ton, &c. p. 153.

† *ib.* p. 166.

‡ *Roussel, Vol. 3. p. 300.*

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tions in his Favour. It was expressly agreed in the Treaty, that this Subsidy should be paid by the *most Christian King*; but a Dispute arising, some Years afterwards, between the Crowns of *France* and *Denmark*, concerning the Difference of * *Danish* and *Hamburg* Money, We were so good as to prevent the ill Consequences of such a Dispute, by paying the Difference our selves; which amounted to a considerable Sum.

The † *Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel* contracted likewise with his *Britannick Majesty* to keep a Body of 12000 Men in a Readiness for his Service, upon certain Conditions, which do not fully appear in the *publick Convention*, nor any where else; but it is well known that *these Troops* have cost the *British Nation* almost a *Million and a half Sterl.* without doing us the least Service, during the whole Time They continued in our Pay.

Amongst all these Allies and Auxiliaries, I must not forget his Serene Highness the Duke of ‡ *Wolffenbuttle*; who brought up the Rear of this formidable Confederacy, and not only engaged to GUARANTY all his Majesty's Dominions in *Great Britain, Ireland* and *Germany*, but likewise to furnish a Body of 5000 Men (not to be moved out of *Germany* or *Holland*) for so small a Sum as *twenty five thousand Pounds per Annum*, during the Space of *four Years*; which amounted, for the whole Term, to no more than *one hundred thousand Pounds*.

Having now stated the Case of the *Hanover Alliance* in its full Strength, We are naturally led to the Reasonings of *different Parties*, on this Subject.

C

The

* *Votes of the House of Commons* for the Year 1731-2. or *The Craftsman*, Numb. 313. † *Collection of Treaties*, Vol. 4. p. 438. ‡ *Ib.* 178.

The Gentlemen of the Country Party argued, that supposing the *secret Treaty of Vienna* to be without Foundation, We were a little too precipitate in throwing off an *old Ally*, under that Pretence; and though they were very far from adopting the vulgar Notion, * that ENGLAND ought never to be in Peace and Friendship with FRANCE, They apprehended that so close a Conjunction, at that Time, naturally tended to make us too dependent upon Her, and would not produce the good Effects which were proposed by it.

To This it was answered by the other Party, that † Power is fluctuating, and though We did lend the Emperor an helping Hand, We are not to let Him do what He pleases; that when We set Him up, it was good Politicks, and now it is equally good to take Him down; or, as the ‡ Enquirer more gravely argued, that We should find in HIM, at last, the Enemy We dreaded only in ANOTHER. In short, it was then the Court-Doc-trine, that France was so much reduced, and the Emperor grown so formidable by the Success of the late War, that the Balance of Europe required us to shift Hands, and throw our Weight into the Scale of France, which was now become our most natural Ally. For this Reason, it was argued that we might safely rely on her good Faith and Sincerity; nay, a certain Gentleman undertook to be her Guaranty, and made Himself answerable for her Conduct, by repeated Declarations in the House of Commons.

Let us now proceed to the Consequences of this Alliance, and see how far the Reasonings of either Party were justified by them.

As

* *Craftsman*, Vol. 1. p. 111. *The Case of Dunkirk*, p. 47. or, *The Craftsman*, Vol. 6. p. 208. † See A Letter to the Occasional Writer, printed in the Year 1727. or the Occasional Writer, Numb. 3. p. 13. ‡ p. 7.

As the *Treaty of Hanover* was concerted with a profess'd Design to defeat the dangerous Projects of the *Vienna Allies*; it was evident, at first Sight, that such Measures would be taken, as must necessarily create some farther Misunderstandings, if not an absolute Rupture, between the different Parties in the *two Alliances*; for when such strong Suspicions are entertain'd on *one Side*, as to put them in Arms against the *other*, and the *latter* know themselves to be innocent of the *Designs* laid to their Charge, They will naturally look upon such *Apprehensions* as mere Pretences to pick a Quarrel with Them, and resent those Measures as *Acts of Hostility*, which are carried on under Colour of *Self-Defence*.

How far This was our Case, with Relation to the *Spaniards*, at the Time I am speaking of; or how far the *Spaniards*, at least, might reason in such a Manner, will soon appear by the Event.

The Conclusion of the *Treaty of Hanover* was immediately followed with a considerable Augmentation of our *Land-Forces* at Home, besides the 12000 *Hessians*, and *other foreign Troops*, retain'd in our Pay, as I have already observed.

At the same Time, *three large Squadrons of Ships of War* were fitted out at a vast Expence, and dispatch'd with all possible Expedition to different Parts of the World; *one* to the *Baltick*, *another* to the Coast of *Spain*, and a *third* to the *West-Indies*. The Motives for equipping *these Fleets*, and the good Effects They produced, are stated very pompously in the *Enquiry*.

That sent to the * *Baltick*, says He, was design'd to prevent the *Czarina's* Scheme for deposing the King of *Sweden*, and thereby preserve *the Balance of*
the

* *Enquiry*, p. 95.

the North. But it happen'd a little untowardly, That *Sweden* had just before made Peace with the *Muscovites*, and was under no Apprehension from Them; as They acquainted Sir *Charles Wager*, our Admiral, when he came before *Stockholm*, and made Them a voluntary Offer of his Assistance. Another right reverend Gentleman, who afterwards wrote upon the same Subject, tells us, That *this Squadron* was sent to the *Baltick*, not only to prevent the *Czarina's* Design, but * to enable our FRIENDS in *Sweden* to declare for Us, by awing the Duke of *Holstien's* Party, who did all in their Power to obstruct the *Accession*. This, it seems, with the *Subsidy* before mentioned to the *King*, and some other proper Applications to the leading Men, produced the desired Effect, and sufficiently justified that *Expedition*.

The Squadron sent to the Coasts of † *Spain* was ordered to prevent an Attempt from thence, in Favour of the Pretender, by virtue of the *Secreet offensive Treaty* so often mentioned; and the Enquirer tells us, ‡ that the Appearance of this FLEET upon the *Spanish Coasts*, did actually prevent the Execution of such an Attempt. But here again that Writer seems to be mistaken, or misinform'd; for it appears by Sir *John Jennings's* Letter, dated *August 10. 1726.* and made publick here, * that the Spaniards were so little prepared to invade Us, that when he came on their Coasts, they seem'd to be in the greatest Consternation; that all the Troops they could assemble did not exceed Three Thousand Men; and that Those were in very bad Condition.

As

* *The Treaty of Seville impartially considered*, printed for Roberts in the Year 1730. p. 10. or *The Craftsman*, Vol. 6. p. 66. † *Enquiry*, p. 93. ‡ *Ib.* p. 97. * See the Letter itself; or *The Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 266.

As to the Squadron sent to the *West-Indies*, the
 * *same Author* tells us, That it fully answered the
 Purposes for which it was intended, 'not only by
 'protecting the *Trade* of his Majesty's Subjects in
 'those Parts from the Depradations of the *Spaniards*,
 'but also by preventing the Return of the *Galleons*
 'with their Stores of Money, and thereby disap-
 'pointing those Attempts, which would have been
 'made, and perhaps succeeded, had such Riches
 'come to their Aid.

Let us now turn our Eyes a little to the other con-
 tracting Powers in the *Treaty of Hanover*, and see what
 Part they acted, during all these expensive and ha-
 zardous Expeditions on our Side.

The *Enquirer* told us, that ‡ 'the Dispositions
 'made by FRANCE, ever since the signing of the
 '*Treaty of Hanover*, more than kept Pace with Us,
 'in the Largeness of the Expence.' To support
 this Assertion, he assured us, 'that the most Chri-
 'stian King augmented his Regular Troops with
 'twenty five thousand Men; and, at the same Time,
 'ordered a Levy of the *Militia*, to the Number of
 'sixty thousand Men; besides twelve thousand Inva-
 'lids, put into good Order, for the Defence of his
 'Citadels and Forts; by which Means that King
 'could, without Inconvenience, send 165000 Men
 'of his regular Troops into the Field. Such, says
 'He, hath been the Disposition there for some Time,
 'in order to shew the new Allies (meaning of *Vienna*)
 'that France is not only in Earnest, but in a well
 'disposed Condition of disputing any Attempts a-
 'gainst itself, or its ALLIES.

Now, supposing all this to be true, it is very far
 from doing the Court-Party any Service in the present
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* *Enquiry*, p. 94, 96. ‡ *Ib.* 102.

Argument; for if the *French* had actually made any such *Dispositions*, I believe the *Enquirer* would be very much puzzled to prove that They more than kept Pace with Us in the Largeness of the *Expence*; or that the *Allies* ever received any Benefit from them. But We may go a little farther, and defy Him to prove that there really was any such Augmentation, either of their regular *Troops*, or their *Militia*, as he seems to assert, whatever *Dispositions* might have been made, or *Orders* given, for that Purpose. Indeed, to speak impartially, the Court of *France* seemed ready enough to perform their Engagements with us against the *Emperor*; but We found out, at last, that the Execution of them would not be intirely consistent with our own *Interest*, and therefore very wisely excused Them.

The same Author acknowledges that the * united Provinces came late into the Alliance; which he ascribes to the Frame of their Constitution; but, perhaps, it might be partly owing to the Nature of the Treaty itself; and, I am sure, He might have added very justly, that they acceded at last, under † very extensive Limitations. However, he assured us, that “from the Time of their Accession, they shew’d a Warmth and Vigour worthy of the Occasion. They agreed unanimously, said He, upon such Augmentations of their LAND FORCES, as by the next Spring would make them above 5000 effective Men; and the necessary Measures were taken for their having a FLEET at Sea of twenty Men of War.” He added, “that they had been at a very great Charge, in providing their Magazines, and putting their Barrier and Frontier Places into a good Posture of Defence.

To

* Enquiry, p. 103.

† Collection of Treaties, Vol. 4. p. 153.

To this it was answered, that the *States* made no farther Augmentation of their *Land-Forces* than what was immediately necessary for their own Defence, and the Support of their *Barrier Towns*, in Pursuance of *Treaties*. How far They have put *these Places* into a good Posture of Defence, let their late *Act of Neutrality*, and the present State of Affairs determine. As to their *Fleet*, whatever *Measures* might have been taken for fitting one out, every Body knows that they were never put in Execution.——But of This I shall speak more particularly in another Place.

We were afterwards told, in * *another Treatise*, that his Majesty, as Elector, promised a Body of twelve thousand Men to join the Danes; and, for that Purpose, increased his Hanoverian Troops from sixteen thousand to twenty two thousand Men. But that is a Point, which, I am told, would bear some farther Explanation than the *Author* was pleased to give it.——I shall only observe, that the Deficiency of the *French Subsidy* to *Denmark*, was partly made good by certain Deductions out of the Money granted by Parliament for the Support of the *Hessian Forces*; and that when † *some Gentlemen* desir'd to be inform'd, whether any more, and what Deductions had been made out of *that Money*, the Motion was very prudently rejected.

As for the Courts of *Sweden*, *Denmark*, *Hesse* and *Wolfenbuttle*, They were rather *stipendary Auxiliaries* than *Allies* and *Confederates*; so that They had little more to do, than to receive our Money, in regular Payments, and keep their Troops in a Readiness to march, whenever we should demand them.——How far they complied even with these

Terms,

* *Considerations on the present State of Affairs in Europe, &c.* printed for *Roberts* in the Year 1730. p. 16.

† See the *Votes of the House of Commons* for that Year.

Terms, I am not able to say, the Nation having never had any Occasion for their Service.

France and *Holland* were therefore the two Powers on whom we chiefly rely'd; and as They were much more essentially interested in the Consequences of the *Vienna Treaty* than *Great Britain*, We had Reason to expect that They should bear, at least, an equal Proportion in the Danger and Expence of opposing it.——This Point therefore ought to be examin'd a little farther.

I said, that, immediately after the Conclusion of the *Hanover Treaty*, We dispatched three large Squadrons to the *Baltick*, the *Mediterranean*, and the *West-Indies*. The first of these produced little more Effect than procuring the Accession of *Sweden*, at a very great Expence to this Nation; but the other two were attended with Consequences so well known, that they hardly require any Comment. The *Instructions* to our Admiral, were certainly as moderate as were ever sent out with two such naval Armaments; yet even blocking up the *Galleons* at *Porto Bello* with one of them, and hovering round the Coasts of *old Spain*, in an hostile Manner, with the other, were look'd upon at that Court as *Acts of Hostility*, and resented accordingly. Orders were immediately dispatch'd for siezing the *South Sea Ship*, and the Effects belonging to that Company, at *la vera Cruz*. The *Spanish Guarda Costa's* and *Privateers* were let loose upon our Merchants, and committed infinite Depredations for several Years together, without any Interruption, or any Reprizals. At the same Time, the *Flotilla*, which was said to be at least as richly laden as the *Galleons*, had the good Fortune to escape our other Squadron in the *Mediterranean*, under the Command of *Sir Charles Wager*; though it

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is confess'd, * *that they steer'd the very Course, where He was station'd to intercept them.* But This was imputed to long Nights, and dark foggy Weather. It was likewise observed, and never contradicted, as well as I can remember, that † several Ships were suffer'd to pass by the same Squadron, even under the Stern of our Admiral, with Stores, Provisions, and other Necessaries, for the Use of the Spanish Camp, which was then in Sight of Gibraltar, and preparing to besiege it. — But, perhaps, This likewise might be occasion'd by long Nights, and foggy Weather.

The Siege of that Place immediately ensued; and though We had been often assured, both within Doors and without, that our *Allies* would make it *Caus Fœderis*, and assist us in the Defence of it, They suffer'd the Siege to be push'd on with the utmost Vigour, for several Months, without giving us the least Succour of Men, Money, or Ships; and the Spaniards, in Return, permitted them to carry on their Trade, both in Europe and the Indies, without any Molestation; whilst they were continually harassing us, both by Sea and Land; to say nothing farther of our Ships which were destroyed, and our Seamen who perished by Thousands in the Service of their Country. Perhaps our *Allies* might judge the Blockade of Portobello, to be an Act of Hostility, as well as the Spaniards, and consequently not think Themselves obliged to support the aggressing Party, by virtue of a defensive Alliance. But whatever might be the Reasons of their Conduct, it is certain, that They took no Part in our Quarrels with Spain, nor so much as moved one Man to our Assistance. Nay, even We contented ourselves with the bare Defence

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of

* *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, &c.* printed for Roberts in the Year 1729. p. 33.

† *Craftsman*. Vol. 4. p. 236.

of *Gibraltar*, so loudly demanded by the Voice of the Nation, without endeavouring to divert Them from the Siege, by bombarding any of their Ports, or ravaging their Coasts; for * *as soon as the Treaties were made, the Accessions procured, and the Army provided at the Expence of Britain, which were necessary for defending lower Saxony, We seemed to have no more to do in the War.* — These were the vigorous Measures so strongly recommended in the † *Enquiry*, as absolutely necessary in such a *Crisis of Danger*, and upon which He founds all his Apology for the Conduct of the Ministry.

At length † *Preliminaries* for a general Pacification were agreed upon; by which a *Cessation of Hostilities*, on both Sides, was stipulated for *seven Years*; and that, within *four Months* after signing *this Convention*, a Congress should be form'd, in which *all the Rights and PRETENSIONS of the contracting Powers should be examined, discuss'd and determined.* But as soon as the *Articles* were produced in Publick, it was immediately foreseen, on *one Side*, that the dark and ambiguous Manner of wording them would give Occasion to many Cavils and Disputes; particularly the *second*, which runs in the following mysterious Terms; viz.

* The Rights, or those Things, which, by virtue of the *Treaties of Utrecht, Baden and Quadruple Alliance*, and also of *those Treaties and Conventions* that preceeded the Year 1725. and do not affect the *Emperor and the States General of the united Netherlands*, have been possess'd by any of the *contracting Powers*, shall remain untouch'd; but if any Thing should be found to have been alter'd therein,

* *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 300. † *Enquiry*, p. 81, 93, 110. ‡ *General Collection of Treaties*, Vol. 4. p. 174.
* *Ib.* Vol. 4. p. 175.

‘ therein, or not to have been put in Execution, the
 ‘ *Alteration made*, or the *Thing not executed*, shall, in
 ‘ a *Congress* to be held, be discuss’d and decided
 ‘ according to the Tenor of the said *Treaties* and *Con-*
 ‘ *ventions*.

As soon, I say, as *this Article* was read, many Gentlemen apprehended some latent Design in it; and the Authors of the † *Craftsman* plainly intimated, that this studied Ambiguity was made use of to conceal the true Intent of the *Article* from common Observation; I mean, *that the Spanish Pretension to Gibraltar was to be discuss’d and decided at the Congress*.

On the *other Side*, it was asserted, that *this Article* was so far from preserving the Claim of *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, that it absolutely extinguished it. This Point was canvass’d at large by the * *Author of the Enquiry*, and *John Trot*, to whom I refer the Reader, and believe He will find that the *latter* had as much the Advantage of his Adversary in the *Argument*, as he afterwards had in the *Event*.

It was likewise apprehended by the Gentlemen of the *Country Party*, that some other Stipulations in the *Preliminaries* were not express’d in such full and plain Terms, as to cut off all Pretences for any farther Wrangling and Chicane. But the Gentlemen on the *other Side* affected to laugh at these Apprehensions, as the Phantoms of distemper’d Brains, or the Artifices of factious Malecontents, congratulating Themselves on having surmounted all Difficulties, and laid the Foundation of a *solid and lasting Peace*.

Yet here again the *Country Party* were fully justify’d in their Suspicions by the *Event*; for the *Preliminaries*

† *Craftsman*, Vol. 2. p. 64, 118. * *Defence of the Enquiry*, p. 26. *Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 288.

ries were no sooner sign'd, than new Disputes began to be started about the *Meaning* of them, † and such *Interpretations* to be put upon the *Words* of these Articles, as utterly destroyed the real *Intent and Design* of them. The *Spaniards* insisted, that a meer *Cessation of Hostilities*, as stipulated by the *Preliminaries*, did not imply an *actual raising of the Siege*; and that the *Restitution* of the Ship *Prince Frederick*, with her *Cargo*, was not mentioned, or included in them. Besides This, the Court of *Spain* demanded an *Indulto* of 20 per Cent. on the *Effects* of private Persons embarked in the *Flotilla*, contrary to the 5th Article of the *Preliminaries*, as our *Politicians* and their *Advocates* interpreted it.

These Points having been warmly litigated by the different Parties, for eight or nine Months, They were adjusted by another *Convention*, negotiated by the Count de *Rothemburg*, Minister of *France*, (for *We* had no Minister at the Court of *Spain* at that Time) and sign'd at the *Pardo* the 6th of *March*, 1728. This *Instrument* contain'd an *Explanation* of the *Preliminaries*, and it was once more solemnly stipulated, * that all the *respective PRETENSIONS*, on each Side, should be produced, debated and decided in the *Congress*; with a particular Engagement, that their *Britannick and Catholick Majesties* would abide by what should be there regulated.

In the mean Time, it was agreed, that the *British Squadrons* should be order'd, without Delay, to withdraw from the Seas of *old and new Spain*; in Consideration of which, his *Catholick Majesty* likewise engaged, that the *Blockade of Gibraltar* should be immediately raised; that a clear and express Order

† *Defence of the Enquiry*, p. II. * *General Collection of Treaties*, Vol. 4. p. 182. *Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 292.

der should be sent, without Delay, for restoring the Ship *Prince Frederick*, with her Cargo, to the Agents of the *South Sea Company*; and that the Effects of the *Flotilla* should be forthwith deliver'd to the respective Proprietors.

These Conditions being accepted on *both Sides*, his *Catholick Majesty* ratify'd the *Preliminaries*; but, before the Ratifications were exchanged, some new Disputes arose, concerning the *Orders* agreed to be sent to the *West Indies* in Pursuance of *this Convention*. These fresh Difficulties took up some Time longer; but were likewise got over by the Count de *Rothemburg* and Mr. *Vandermeer*, who managed all our Affairs at the Court of *Spain*, and the Congress was opened at *Soissons*, on the 3d — 14th of *June*, 1728.

This Point being at length obtain'd, after a tedious Course of Negotiation and Expedients, the ministerial Writers began to triumph again, as if nothing but the *Form of a Treaty* was wanting to accommodate all our Differences, and establish the publick Tranquillity on a lasting Foundation. They gave us the strongest Assurances that all Interruptions to our Trade would be effectually removed for the future; that our plunder'd Merchants would receive full Satisfaction for their Losses; and that our Right to the Possession of *Gibraltar* was so firmly secured to us by the *Preliminaries*, and the *Act of Ratification*, that it would not be so much as mentioned in the Congress. These Things, I say, were confidently promised by the ministerial Writers without Doors, and even, within Doors, by Those who set them to work. But as the Gentlemen on the other Side could see nothing in either of these Instruments, which contained any clear and explicate Engagements upon these Heads, They were not quite so sanguine in their Expectations, and the Event more than warranted all their Suspicions.

cions. The *Plenipotentiaries* did little more than assemble in Form at *Soissons*, and produce their *Credentials*; after which, having spent five or six Months in *Ceremonies* and *Diversions*, They broke up and separated, without adjusting any one material Point in Dispute.

It is true, indeed, that a certain Plan of Accommodation, called a *Provisional Treaty*, was framed by the Ministers of the *Hanover Allies*, during this Assembly, and sent to the respective Courts for their Approbation; but as this *Draught of a Treaty* was neither relish'd at home, nor accepted abroad, it does not deserve much Notice. I shall only observe, in general, that it was little more than the *Preliminaries* new modelled, and digested into the Form of a *Treaty*, without any specifick Explanation of *those Points* which most immediately affected the Interests of *Great Britain*.

As to *Gibraltar*, several noble Peers were so far from being satisfy'd that our Right to it was effectually secured by *this Project*, that the following Motion was made in the *House of Lords*; viz. moved to resolve * that it is the Opinion of *this House*, that, for the Honour of his Majesty, and the Preservation and Security of the Trade and Commerce of this Kingdom, effectual Care should be taken in the *present Treaty*, that the King of *Spain* do renounce all Claim and Pretension to *Gibraltar* and the Island of *Minorca*, in plain and strong Terms." — But, after a warm Debate, the Question being put thereupon, it was carried in the Negative; upon which the *Peers*, who made and supported *this Motion*, enter'd their † *Protest*.

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A Motion to the same Purpose was afterwards made in the * *House of Commons*; which was likewise carried in the Negative, by a great Majority.

The *Country Party*, in both Houses, were equally dissatisfy'd with that Part of the *Provisional Treaty* which related to the *Spanish Depredations*; and the *Lords* moved to resolve, '† that it appears to ' *this House*, that the Expence of the Squadron sent ' to the *West-Indies*, under the Command of Vice- ' Admiral *Hosier*, having been born by *this Nation* ' alone, though design'd to prevent the *Spaniards* ' from seizing the Effects belonging to his Majesty's ' *Allies*, as well as his *Subjects*, which were on board ' the *Flota* and *Galleons*, and from applying the ' *Treasure* to disturb the Peace and invade the Li- ' berties of *Europe*, hath been an unreasonable Bur- ' den on this Kingdom.'—But this Question was also resolved in the Negative, after a long Debate; upon which the *Country Lords* enter'd † another *Protest*.

If any Persons should be curious to see a more particular Account of *this Treaty*, I refer Them to a * *Pamphlet* published on that Occasion, and an Answer to it, under the Name of † *Raleigh*.

It will be found, perhaps, that *this Project* served some anniversary Purposes, for which it seem'd chiefly to be calculated; but as soon as those Ends were answered, we heard no more of it. The Prospect of an Accomodation immediately vanish'd, and Affairs seem'd to be once more tending to a Rupture. Military Preparations were resumed in all Parts.

A * *Historical Register*, Vol. 14. p. 147. † *Ib.* p. 151.
 † *Ib.* * *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain*,
 &c. p. 37. printed for Roberts in the Year 1729.
 † *Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 239.

Parts of *Europe*, and particularly in *England*, which is seldom behind Hand upon such Occasions. A powerful Fleet was fitted out with the utmost Expedition, and made a gallant Apperance at *Spithead*, under the Command of Sir *Charles Wager*. It was there join'd by a Squadron of *Dutch* Ships of War, and seem'd to portend some Enterprize of great Importance; but it afterwards appeared that the *Dutch* Squadron was neither *viſtalled*, nor otherwise provided for any Expedition, and the Admiral Himself declared that He had no Orders to attend the *Engliſh* Fleet any farther. Having therefore kept us Company for some Months, and participated in our *naval Diversions*, they sail'd back to *Holland*, and our own Ships soon after return'd to their respective Harbours.

We were told, indeed, that this PROVISIONAL FLEET, as it was then call'd, struck such a Terror into the Hearts of our Enemies, that We soon* heard of their making Advances, coming into Concessions, abating in their Demands, removing Obstacles, giving agreeable Assurances, and doing the utmost could be expected to shew their Inclination to renew the ancient Amity subsisting between the two Crowns. Nay, it was strongly insinuated, in the same Paper, that the Preservation of *Jamaica*, as well as our own Coasts, from an Invasion, the Sovereignty of the Seas, the Freedom of our Commerce, and even the Security of our present Establishment, were owing to this formidable Armada, which frightened our Enemies out of their Designs, and at last produced the glorious Treaty of *Seville*.

But

* The *London Journal*, Octob. 1729. or *The Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 173.

But here it deserves a short Remark, that, during these Exploits at *Spithead*, ‡ a DAUPHIN was born in *France*, which broke the *Spanish* Faction in that Kingdom, and had certainly some Influence on the Court of *Spain*, if they could want any Motives to accept of Terms so advantageous to Them as were stipulated by *that Treaty*.

Thus far the State of our Affairs was, in some Measure, brought down, about four Years ago, in a * *little Piece* occasioned by the Publication of the Treaty before-mentioned, and some † *Observations* upon it. This gave Rise to new Disputes, of which I am now to give some Account.

It cannot be thought wonderful that the Court Writers and their Patrons, who triumph'd so much the Year before on the *meer Project* or Draught of a Treaty, should discover the same Spirit of Exultation upon procuring a *formal Treaty*, actually signed, which the ‡ *Writer* before me observes is *beyond the Reach of the most artful Malice*; tho there was still wanting the Accession of *one Power*, whose Consent was most necessary to the putting it in Execution; for as the Introduction of 6000 *Spanish* Forces into the strong Places of *Tuscany*, *Parma* and *Placentia*, instead of 6000 *Neutrals*, stipulated by the *Quadruple Alliance*, was the Basis of the *Seville Treaty*, the Concurrence of the *Emperor*, to whom the *Feodality* of those States belong'd, was certainly requisite to the amicable Execution of it, according to the Doctrine of the *Enquiry* itself, where it is asserted †† that He

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‡ *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 177. * *A short View of the State of Affairs*, &c. since published in *The Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 245. † *Observations on the Treaty concluded at Seville*, &c. printed for Roberts in the same Year. † *ib.* p. 7. †† *Enquiry*, p. 9.

ALONE was capable of disturbing it.' And yet He was not so much as complimented, in the *Treaty*, with an Invitation to accede, as the *Dutch* again were by an express Article.

It was therefore thought expedient to usher *this Treaty* into the World with some explanatory Observations upon it. They could not help foreseeing, that their own Arguments upon *this Subject* were capable of being turned very strongly against Them. They knew very well that the *Author of the Enquiry* had been instructed, but three Years before, to alarm the *British Nation* with the formidable Projects in Favour of † *Don Carlos*, even so far as *universal Monarchy*. They could not forget that the Author of the ‡ *British Journal*, (who now makes a shining Figure in the *Free Briton*) but a few Months before, represented the Establishment of *this Prince* in *Italy*, as a Point of such dangerous Consequence, that it was opposed at the Congresses of *Cambray* and *Soissons*, by all the principal Powers of *Europe*, particularly *Great Britain*;

' Since, if *Don Carlos* should ever succeed to *Tuscany*, *LEGHORN*, the Mart of our *Mediterranean* Trade, will be in his Possession; and consequently *Spain* will have Power at any Time to deprive us of Commerce in the *Levant*, as well as the *West Indies*.

' In which Case, says He, it will be nearly the same, as if we give up *Gibraltar* and *Portmahon*; because those Places will be of little Service to our *Mediterranean* Commerce, when the Marts of that Trade shall intirely exclude us from all Traffick.

This

† *Enquiry*, p. 22, 28, 86. ‡ See *The British Journal*, Jan. 4. 1728-9. or *The Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 80.

This, I say, was the Doctrine advanced by the Author of the *British Journal*, in the Month of January, 1728-9. and maintained, in another Place, by an *eminent Statesman*, who had the Honour of conducting our foreign Negotiations for several Years together; but a new Turn of Affairs, a few Months afterwards, laid Them under a Necessity of recanting these Arguments in the fullest Manner, and extolling that *very Succession*, which They had so lately condemn'd, as a * *Master-String*, which They had touched with Success, and one of the best good Fortunes which could befall this Nation.

However, such glaring Contradictions from the same Mouths, and in so short a Course of Time, were thought to require some farther Apology before the *Parliament* met. It was upon this Occasion, that the *Observations* were published, and dispersed through the Kingdom by *Authority*, as I remember.——Now, the principal Arguments in this Piece are reducible to the following Heads.

First, † ' That Great Britain will be a considerable Gainer by this Variation, as We are freed from the Engagement We were before under, of paying one third Part of the Expence, which would have been requisite for maintaining neutral Garrisons in the Dutchies of Tuscany and Parma.

Secondly, ‡ ' That, had the Succession to Tuscany and Parma been left open, all Italy, considering the Strength of the Emperor in that Country, must have probably fallen into his Hands, or, at least, into such Hands as must have had an entire Dependence on Him; with some very severe Reflections

* The *British Journal* signed Thomas Potts, published in Aug. 1729. or The *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 101.

† *Observations*, p. 12. ‡ *Ib.* p. 9.

‘ tions on his *Imperial Majesty*, as a Prince ‘ who
 ‘ had made but ill Returns of Gratitude to *this*
 ‘ Nation, for having already contributed to his
 ‘ Grandeur in that Part of the World.

And *thirdly*, ‘ * That the *Emperor* cannot reason-
 ‘ ably take Offence at *this Stipulation*, being Him-
 ‘ self under previous Engagements, by the *Quadru-*
 ‘ *ple Alliance*, to make the Succession of *Don Carlos*
 ‘ effectual. — Neither can the *Variation*, made
 ‘ by the *present Treaty*, of *Spanish* instead of *Swiss*
 ‘ *Garrisons*, justify, in Reason and good Sense, his
 ‘ *Imperial Majesty*’s not consenting to it, unless He
 ‘ can shew that He may be prejudiced by *that Alte-*
 ‘ *ration*.

To the *first* of these Arguments it was readily
 answered, † that the Charge of maintaining 2000
 Men in *Italy*, for some Time, ought not to be put
 in Balance against the Dangers We should run of
 involving our selves in a War, by undertaking to ef-
 fectuate the Introduction of *Spanish* Troops, and to
 guaranty this Succession for ever, ‡ *so that it may*
rest secure and exempt from ALL EVENTS. — It
 might have been added, that this Plea of *Frugality*
 was somewhat improperly urged, at a Time when
 the Nation was at the Expence of maintaining so
 many numerous Bodies of Men, both Abroad and
 at Home, without the same Reason.

The *second Argument* is built on the formidable
 Power of the *Emperor*, which was the fashionable
 Doctrine at that Time; and from thence it was ar-
 gued, that *this Variation* was necessary to prevent his
 over-running all *Italy*. In Answer to this, it was ob-
 served

* *Observations*, p. 10. † *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 266.
 ‡ See the *Treaty*, Art. 9, 10, 11, 12.

served by the Gentlemen on the *other Side*, * that if his *Imperial Majesty* was really so strong in *those Parts*, as He was represented, He would be able to give such an Opposition to the Execution of the *Treaty*, as would *plunge us in the greatest Difficulties*. But They went farther, and desired to take the *contrary* of this for granted. — † ‘ Let us suppose, (*says one of these Writers*) that the Introduction and Establishment of the *Spaniards* in *Italy*, should be made with so superior a Power, that the *Emperor* and *Princes* concern’d are forced to submit upon *our Terms*, instead of making *their own*; will the *Difficulties* be all removed? Will all the Inconveniences to *Great Britain*, with which *this Treaty* may be attended, vanish away? They certainly will not. *Our Measures* are so wisely taken, that the easiest and shortest Manner of *effectuating* them, is likewise the easiest and shortest Way to render *the little We have stipulated for ourselves* precarious.

But, *thirdly*, Though the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* was recommended, under the last Article, as a necessary Expedient to curb the *Emperor’s* exorbitant Power; yet, we were likewise told, a little paradoxically, that *He could not reasonably take Offence at it*; nor justify his not consenting to it; unless *He could shew that He might be prejudiced by that Alteration*. Now this very Concession, as the *Country Gentleman* observed, was, in Effect, giving up the whole Cause; since his *Imperial Majesty* might easily shew that *He should be prejudiced by such an Alteration*; and here, indeed, lies the whole Stress of the Argument upon this Point.

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* *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 265, 289.

† *Ib.* 293.

It was allow'd on the *Country Side*, that the *Emperor* was a Party in the *Quadruple Alliance*, which establish'd *this Succession*, and had thereby engaged to make it effectual. But They could not agree with the *Observer* and his *Patrons*, concerning the *Variation* in Dispute, for several Reasons, which I will sum up in as few Words as possible.

In the *first Place*, They apprehended, that supposing *this Alteration* not to be prejudicial to the Interests of his *Imperial Majesty*; yet that the * *Manner* of making it, without his *Consent*, and by Way of *Triumph* over Him, as a great Fetch in Politicks, would be thought a Reflection upon his *Honour*, at least, and might be attended with fatal Consequences.

But They likewise undertook to prove, that the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* would be really prejudicial both to the *Emperor* and the *Empire*, even according to the *Observer's* Method of Reasoning; for He plainly intimated, that one Design of the *Seville Treaty* was to restrain the *Emperor's* Power in *Italy*; and consequently it was *his Interest* to defeat that Design, however it might be the Interest of *others* to put it in Execution.

This avow'd End of the *Seville Treaty* was aggravated by *another*, which was likewise cry'd up by the *ministerial Writers* as a *Master-piece of Politicks*; I mean, the Separation of *Spain* from the *Emperor*, and thereby dissolving the *Vienna Alliance*, which had been represented so very advantageous to the latter: Did not This affect the Interest of his *Imperial Majesty*? or could it be reasonably expected that He would not resent it?

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Nay, They went still farther, and, I think, demonstrated, that the Variation from *Neutral* to *Spanish Troops*, (without insisting on the *Affront*, or having any Regard to the *Vienna Alliance*) was highly prejudicial both to the *Emperor* and the *Empire*; for the *neutral Troops*, stipulated by the *Quadruple Alliance*, were designed not only to secure the * *eventual Succession* of *Don Carlos*, but likewise the *Rights of Sovereignty established in the EMPEROR and EMPIRE over these States*. Now this Part of the Condition was intirely revers'd by the *Variation* in Dispute; and the *Observer's* Argument, upon this Head, was of Course reduced to the following Absurdity; † ' that when a *mutual Security* is given and accepted by two *Parties*, for making good a Bargain, this Security may be taken from one of the *Parties* against his Consent, and the Benefit of it be wholly apply'd to the other, and yet no Prejudice be done to the former.

To This it was added, by the Writers on the *Country Side*, that his *Imperial Majesty* appeared very plainly to look upon the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* in this Light, by refusing to consent to it, whilst He was under so beneficial an Alliance with *Spain*, and ‡ even suffering Himself to be disunited from that *Crown*, rather than comply. His Reason for this was very obvious; since, if the Court of *Spain* had no other Design than to secure the *Duchies of Tuscany and Parma* for *Don Carlos*, according to the *Quadruple Alliance*, it is certain that *neutral Troops* would have been effectual for that Purpose; nay, more effectual than *Spanish Troops*, if We may

* *Collection of Treaties*, Vol. 4. p. 57. *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 285. † *Ib.* 287. ‡ *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 264.

may believe the *Enquiry*, where the * NEUTRAL GARRISONS, appointed by the *Quadruple Alliance*, are call'd the great *Bulwarks of the Succession of Don Carlos to Tuscany*; but their resolute Perseverance in desiring and insisting on *Spanish Garrisons*, gave his *Imperial Majesty* just Grounds to apprehend some farther View; and one of the Writers on the *Country Side*, seems to be pretty right in his Conjectures upon this Occasion.

† ' We all know, says He, how precious the Possessions of *Italy* are to the *Imperialists*; how much the Point, to which They are arrived in that Country, of Dominion, Power, and Influence, hath been always the chief Object of their Policy.——Now will it be at all strange, if they look on the *Variation* made in the *Quadruple Alliance* as a Measure taken to give Them a Rival in that Country, where they are at present indisputably the superior Power? Will not these Garrisons of *Spaniards*, pretended to be placed there for the Security of the eventual Succession of *Don Carlos*, make them look on *Parma, Placentia, Portoferraio, and Leghorn*, as so many Places of Arms, put into the Hands of an old Enemy, an unfaithful Ally, and a certain Rival? May they not apprehend, that neither Pretences nor Means will be wanting, if the Treaty of *Seville* hath its Effect, to introduce greater Numbers of *Spanish*, and even *French* Troops, into the Heart of *Italy*, and to serve the Emperor as *Ferdinand the Catholick* served *Lewis the 12th.* in Consequence of the silly Partition to which the latter consented.

In

* *Enquiry*, p. 25.

† *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 288.

In another Piece, the Consequences of the *Seville Treaty* are farther explained and foretold.

* ' It is said, that *France* and *England* are Guaranties for the *Emperor's* Dominions in *Italy*, against any Encroachments which *Spain* may attempt to make upon them.

' I answer, that the Purposes of the *Quadruple Alliance* would have been effectually secured by *neutral Troops* ; but it is extremely probable, that the Introduction of *Spaniards* will be followed by *Invasions* on the *Emperor's* Dominions ; for though the Introduction of only 6000 *Spaniards* is stipulated, yet if They are put in Possession of *Leghorn*, They may admit as many more as They please, by the Help of their *Fleet*, which is large enough for that Purpose, and will be as good as a Bridge between *Italy* and *Spain*. In this Case, *France* will not be very forward to execute their Engagements of Guaranty in the *Emperor's* Behalf ; and if *England* does, she must lose her Trade to *Spain* and *Leghorn*. If *France* should think fit to quarrel with the *Emperor*, They would encourage *Spain* to invade his *Italian* Dominions ; and when the *Emperor* complains of it, They will, without much Difficulty, (according to the modern Way of interpreting the Obligations of Treaties) find out some Act or other of the *Emperor*, which they will alledge as a Reason for having forfeited a Right to that Guaranty.

Upon the whole, it was concluded by these Writers, that his *Imperial Majesty* would not consent to the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons*, unless He should

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* *The Case of the Hessian Forces, &c.* since published in *The Craftsman*, Vol. 6. p. 311.

be brought into it by * *another Expedient*, which might prove equally productive of bad Consequences; I mean our Guaranty of the PRAGMATIC SANCTION.

They likewise observed, with too much Reason, that as the Reconciliation of *Spain* and the *Emperor*, by the *first Vienna Treaty*, was the luckiest Circumstance which could possibly happen to us at that Time, and ought to have excited our Joy, instead of alarming us with such a terrible Panick; so They apprehended † *that the Separation of those two Courts would be followed by a new Union between France and Spain, more formidable to Us than That which We had dissolv'd.*

We were told, indeed, ‡ *that if Spain should presume to break the Bounds of Power in Italy, there are formidable Princes will rise in Opposition; perhaps OURSELVES.* But to This it was answer'd, that besides the ridiculous Employment of being always doing and undoing, *France* might recover so much Strength, and the *Emperor* be so far reduced by *these Measures*, that it would not be in our Power to set Matters upon their right Foot again. Upon this Supposition, one of the *Writers on the Country Side* made the following Observation, which deserves particular Attention at this Time.

* ' If the whole Weight of national Vengeance is ever to fall, it ought surely to crush *Those* who precipitate their Country, by a long Series of Blunders and Mistakes, into such a terrible Dilemma, that We cannot observe our *Treaties*, without being exposed to fight against our general Interests, and without

* *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 292. † *Ib.* Vol. 5. p. 308.
 ‡ *British Journals* of August 1729. or *The Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 100. * *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 291.

* without finding, when we return to them, that the
 * *Weakness of our Allies* and the *Strength of our Enemies*,
 * are the Works of our own *Hands*.

I believe This will be thought sufficient to explain
 the Reasonings on *both Sides*, concerning the Intro-
 duction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Italy*, * which made
 one of the principal *Stipulations* of the new *Treaty*, as
 the *Observer* very frankly acknowledg'd. But it
 was natural to enquire what Terms We had obtain-
 ed for *our selves*, in Return for such valuable Obli-
 gations on the Court of *Spain*.

To satisfy this just Expectation, We were assured
 by the *Observer*, † that our *Possessions abroad* were
 * secured to us, beyond all Possibility of Doubt or
 * Cavil; that all our Privileges and Advantages in
 * *Commerce* were re-established upon the Foot of for-
 * mer *Treaties*; and that immediate Reparation
 * was stipulated to our *Merchants* for all the Dama-
 * ges They had suffer'd at any Time, contrary to
 * the *Treaties* of *Utrecht*, or any other *Treaties* which
 * subsisted between *England* and *Spain* to that very
 * Day.

But the *Writers on the other Side* could not find
 any Articles or Words in the *Treaty*, which could
 be fairly interpreted so as to justify these Assuran-
 ces, or to deserve those Encomiums which were be-
 stowed upon it.

They observed, that the *Spaniards* were so far from
 having renounc'd their Pretensions to *Gibraltar*, or
 recogniz'd our Right to the Possession of it, that it is
 not so much as mentioned through the whole *Trea-*
ty; and it hath been since confess'd by an *honourable*
Gentleman in a high Station, ‡ that if *We* had offer'd
 to

* *Observations on the Treaty of Seville*, p. 8. † *Ib.*
 p. 14, &c. ‡ *Craftsman*, Vol. 6, p. 38.

to mention any Thing about Gibraltar, the Spaniards would have broke off all farther Negotiations. We were likewise told by one of his Advocates, that Gibraltar was an old Sore, and that our Ministers were desirous to touch it tenderly; That is, the Court of Spain would not admit of any Words in the Treaty which would annihilate their Pretensions, and did not design to include our Possession of that Place in their general Guaranty of all his Majesty's Kingdoms, States and Dominions. How therefore could it be said with Truth, as the Observer affirm'd, that *We had a very full Acknowledgment on the Part of Spain, of our Right to Gibraltar and the Island of Minorca*; or, that those Possessions were secured to us beyond all Possibility of Doubt or Cavil; when We had obtained no other Security for Them, than what was before complained of in the Preliminaries, the Convention of the Pardo, and the Provisional Treaty? I mean, a Confirmation of all former Treaties, and consequently That of Madrid in the Year 1721. upon which the Spaniards ground their Claim to the Restitution of Gibraltar.

They likewise apprehended, that the Provisions made in this Treaty, for the future Security of our Commerce, and Reparation to our Merchants for their past Sufferings, would prove ineffectual. These Provisions were, that * Commissaries should be appointed on the Part of their Britannick and Catholick Majesties, who should assemble at the Court of Spain, to examine and decide all Differences upon these Heads, with an expresse Stipulation, that they should punctually finish their Commission within the Space of three Years from the Day of signing the present Treaty, without any farther Delay, on any Motive or Pretext whatever.

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It was apprehended, I say, on the *Country Side*, that these Provisions would be very liable to Evasion, by the *Distance of Place*, where the *Commissaries* were to meet, the *Length of Time* allow'd for this Enquiry, and the several Points of which it was to consist; particularly * the Pretensions of his *Catholick Majesty* to the Restitution of the Ships taken in the *Mediterranean* in the Year 1718. an Article, which may be so cast up by the *Spanish Commissaries* as to overbalance the Account of the *British Merchants* by several hundred thousand Pounds.

On the *other Side* it was asserted, that † the Restitution of our Losses since *June 1727.* was to be *immediate and forthwith*, as well as the Introduction of the *Spanish Garrisons* was to be *without Loss of Time*; and that the Affair of the Merchants stood *PRIOR* in the Treaty to the *Tuscan Affair*, and, so far as it was to be *without Loss of Time*, must have the Preference; nay, if it was not performed *immediately*, nothing was obliged to be done in Favour of *Don Carlos*.

Indeed it was reasonable enough to expect, that the *Spaniards* should have been obliged to make our Merchants Reparation for their Losses, before We gratify'd them in so favorite a Point as the Introduction of *Don Carlos*. But though the Article of Reparation happened to stand *prior* in the Treaty to the *Tuscan Affair*, as this *Writer* most sagely observed, yet the Adjudication of the *former* being left to *Commissaries*, who had *three Years* allowed to finish their Enquiry, and the *latter* being to be effectuated *without Loss of Time*, it was easy to perceive which would

* *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 270. † The *Free Briton* extraordinary, in Answer to the *Short View*, printed for *Peele*, in the Year 1730. p. 45.

would have the Preference : And this furnished one Objection of no small Weight against the *Treaty* itself, in which ‘ * We seem’d to make just such a *Bar-gain* as We made in the *Quadruple Alliance*, when ‘ We put *Sicily*, and all that the *Emperor* had to expect from our *Friendship*, into his Hands immediately, although the reciprocal Part, to be perform’d by *Him*, was to be a Work of Time, and although ‘ We had not received Satisfaction from *Him* in some ‘ *Points* about which We were extremely solicitous.

These Reasonings without Doors, concerning the *Treaty* of *Seville*, had likewise the Honour to be strengthened by the Arguments of several noble Lords and Gentlemen of great Distinction without Doors ; particularly in the *House of Peers*, where the following Motions were made, viz.

Die Martis, 27 Jan. 1729.

Moved to resolve, ‘ † that the Agreement in the ‘ *Treaty* of *Seville*, to effectuate the Introduction of ‘ *Spanish* Troops into *Tuscany* and *Parma*, is a manifest Violation of the fifth Article of the *Quadruple Alliance*, tends to involve the Nation in a dangerous and expensive War, and to destroy the Balance ‘ of Power in *Europe*.

‘ *After Debate, the Question was put upon the said Motion, and it was resolved in the Negative.*

Moved to resolve, ‘ that our Right of Sovereignty, ‘ Dominion, Possession, and Propriety to *Gibraltar* ‘ and the Island of *Minorca*, is not ascertained by ‘ the *Treaty* of *Seville*, so as to extinguish the Claims ‘ and Pretensions set up by the *Spaniards*, which ‘ were followed by an actual Siege, since the Cession ‘ of those valuable Places by the *Treaty* of *Utrecht*.

‘ *After*

* *Craftsman*, Vol. 5. p. 293.

† *Historical Register*, Vol. 15. p. 202.

After Debate, the Question was put thereupon, and resolved in the Negative.

Moved to resolve, that the Stipulations in the Treaty of *Seville*, for repairing the Losses of our Merchants, are insufficient and precarious.

After Debate, the Question was put thereupon, and it was resolved in the Negative.

Then it was proposed by some other Lords, to resolve, that the Treaty of Peace, Union and Friendship, concluded at *Seville*, the 9th of November last, doth contain all necessary Stipulations for maintaining and securing the Honour, Dignity, Rights and Possession of the Crown; and that all due Care is taken therein for the Support of the Trade of the Kingdom, and for repairing the Losses suffer'd by the Merchants.

After Debate, the Question was put thereupon, and it was resolved in the Affirmative; upon which several Lords enter'd their * Protest against it, with their Reasons at large, which deserve particular Notice at this Time.

I shall now proceed, according to the Method proposed, to a few short Remarks on the Effects of this Treaty.

In the first Place, it is observable, that his Imperial Majesty was so far from looking on the Introduction of Spanish Garrisons into *Tuscany* and *Parma*, as a trifling Variation from the *Quadruple Alliance*, according to the Doctrine of the Court Writers, that He resented both the Matter and the Manner of it in the strongest Terms, as a downright Infracti^on of Treaties, derogatory to his Honour, and injurious to his Interests, as well as the Rights of the Empire. He ordered his Ministers at several Courts to re-monstrate

monstrate against it as such; and sent a † *Commissional Decree* to the Diet at *Ratisbon*; in which, having vindicated his own Conduct to the *States of the Empire*, there assembled, with Relation to *Don Carlos*, He speaks of the *present Stipulation* in the following Manner. — But, contrary to all Expectation, a particular Treaty hath been concluded at *Seville*, between the Crowns of *Spain, France and Great Britain*, the 9th and subsequent Articles of which (*relating to the Spanish Garrisons*) cannot but raise the highest Indignation; because the most essential Bands of human Society are therein broken; and if *Christian Powers* pretend thus to dispose of the Estates of *third Persons*, all Confidence and good Faith ought to be banished out of the World. Besides, they have no Regard to *former Treaties*, nor to the last *Preliminary Articles*, which were acknowledged by *both Parties* as the Ground-work of the Negotiations for the *general Peace*, and as the only Counterpoise to an exorbitant Power that was designed to be erected in *Europe*. They have no Attention to the *Acts of Guaranty* that have been delivered. They dispose of the Rights and Territories of the *Empire* as They please, even in the Life-time of the *lawful Possessors*. They set so little a Value upon the *Emperor and Empire*, that They would not so much as ask their Consent in an Affair that was properly their own, though *such Consent* was made necessary by the Alliance of *London*. — If therefore *such Conduct* takes Place, and the *new Allies* persist therein, We shall hereafter see *Might* overcome *Right*, and *Engagements* trampled on at Pleasure; and whatever the *new Allies*

' *Allies* shall judge to be most convenient, will always
' be most just, without any Regard to *Things* or
' *Persons*.

His *Imperial Majesty* likewise represents to the *Germanick Body*, as a Merit to Himself, ' † that the
' Fear of being abandon'd by his Ally, the King of
' *Spain*, was not capable of making him take the
' least Step that could prejudice *his Dignity* and That
' of the *Empire*.

The Court of *Vienna* did not content Themselves,
like some other *Politicians*, with shewing their Re-
sentments in *Words* and *Appearances* only; but actu-
ally pour'd a large Army into *Italy*, with Orders to
oppose the Execution of the *Treaty*, and found Means
to maintain Them there all the following Summer,
notwithstanding the Suggestions of the *Court-Party*,
and the wise Precautions We took, by an ‡ *Act* of
Parliament, to prevent the Subjects of this King-
dom from lending Him any Money.

When the *Allies* of *Seville* found the *Emperor* in
Earnest, and fully determined to stand upon his
Defence, They began to halt and beat a Parley.
The Cabinets of *Europe* were again employed in
framing *Expedients*; Couriers were continually pas-
sing from Court to Court; and the publick Prints
amus'd us with nothing but new Plans, or new Re-
ports of Accommodation; whilst a large *Fleet* lay in
the Road of *Barcelona*, and a numerous Body of
Land Forces were assembled on the neighbouring
Coasts, ready to embark, upon the first Notice, for
the intended Expedition. But his *Imperial Majesty*

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having

† *Historical Register*, Vol. 15. p. 134. ‡ See *An Act*
to prohibit his Majesty's Subjects to lend any Sums of Mo-
ney to any foreign Prince, State, or Potentate, &c. in the
Year 1732.

having rejected all the Propositions made to Him, for acceding to the Treaty of *Seville*, and seeming determin'd to abide Extremities, rather than consent to their Measures; that Summer wore out in Negotiation only, and the *Spanish Armada* retired to their Harbours, without any Action, like our Fleet at *Spithead* the Year before.

The Introduction of *Don Carlos*, with *Spanish Troops* into *Italy*, being thus protracted, the Performance of the Articles, in our Favour, was likewise suspended. The *Spaniards* not only continued the Blockade of *Gibraltar*, in the most rigorous Manner, so as to cut off all Communication with the Country; but likewise projected some *new Works* for annoying our Ships in the Bay, which have been since finished. Instead of making our *Merchants* any *immediate Reparation*, by Virtue of that *Priority* in the Treaty, which the *Court-Writers* discovered, They did not so much as nominate *Commissaries*, on their Part, for adjusting those Losses; and seem'd to think Themselves free from all Engagements towards us, till the Stipulations, in Favour of *Don Carlos*, were effectually put in Execution.

Thus did Affairs continue in a doubtful Situation between *Peace* and *War*, as they had continued for several Years past, till the Season of *Parliament* in *Great Britain* came round again; That is, till the Beginning of the Year 1731. about which Time a private Negotiation at *Vienna*, between *Great Britain* and the *Emperor*, began to get Air, and was first hinted to the Publick in the famous *HAGUE LETTER*, printed in the † *Craftsman*; which having since received a *judicial Censure*, I

am

† *Craftsman*, Numb. 235. Sat. Jan. 2. 1730-1.

am not at Liberty to quote, tho' it would be of great Use to my present Purpose; but as it was chiefly built on the 4th Article of the *Hanover Treaty*, and the bad Consequences which might attend any *Breach* of it, I must content my self with laying *that Article* before the Reader. It runs in the following Terms, *viz.*

‡ And as the said *three most serene Kings* are resolved to bind more and more closely the strict Union that subsists amongst Them, by all possible Tokens of good Faith and mutual Confidence, They have reciprocally agreed, not only to enter into no Treaty, Alliance, or Engagement whatever, which may in any Manner whatever be contrary to the Interests of each other; but even faithfully to communicate to each other the Proposals that may be made to Them, and not to take, upon what may be proposed, any Resolution, otherwise than in Concert together, and after a joint Examination of what may conduce to their common Interests, and be proper for maintaining the Balance of Europe, which is so necessary to be preserv'd for the Good of the general Peace.

In less than three Months after the *Hague Letter* was published, a Treaty of Peace and Alliance was actually concluded at *Vienna* between the Emperor and the King of Great Britain, in which the *States General* were likewise included; but neither France nor Spain were so much as mentioned in it; which seem'd to be somewhat extraordinary as to the latter, at least, since the Introduction of *Spanish* Garrisons into *Italy*, with the Emperor's Consent, made one of the principal Stipulations of this new Treaty;

‡ *Collection of Treaties*, Vol. 4. p. 149. *Craftsman*, Vol. 7. p. 223.

Treaty; nay, what is still more surprising, it was with extreme Difficulty that They were brought in to it at last, and even then, not without insisting on several Alterations in the *Act of Approbation*; one of which, if I do not forget, was, that the Introduction of *Don Carlos*, with 6000 *Spanish Troops* into *Italy*, should be effectuated PREVIOUSLY to the Execution of any Engagements on their Part, however they might stand PRIOR in the *Treaty of Seville*; which, by the Way, was concluded above a Year and an Half before. The *Dutch* were still more backward in their Accession, and did not accede, at last, without some ‡ WISE RESTRICTIONS. As for the Court of *France*, They were so far from listening to any Solicitations on this Head, that They exerted their utmost Endeavours to prevent the Concurrence of *Spain*. Nay, They express such a Resentment, both against the *Treaty* itself, and the Manner of negotiating it, that we apprehended nothing less than an Invasion from *Dunkirk*, where some Troops were assembled. This struck us, all on a Sudden, with such a Terror, that the Coasts of *Kent* were immediately cover'd with Regiments of Horse, Foot, and Dragoons, who were order'd to march thither, with the utmost Precipitation, from all Parts of the Kingdom; and the Fluctuation, which such an Alarm naturally occasioned in our Stocks, afforded the Caterpillars of the *Alley* a plentiful Harvest.

However, these Apprehensions being soon dissipated, Sir *Charles Wager* was again dispatch'd to the Coasts of *Spain*, with a large Squadron of *English Ships*, in order to wait upon *Don Carlos* and the *Spanish Troops* to his new Dominions. The Admiral

‡ *Roussel*, Tom. 2. p. 343. 4to. Edit.

miral Ship was fitted out in a most splendid and costly Manner, for the Reception of his SERENE HIGHNESS ; but, after a Course of pompous Compliments and Visits between the Commander of the *Spanish* Fleet, and our Admiral, upon his Arrival at *Cadiz*, and the same Honours having been afterwards paid him at the Court of *Seville*, his Catholick Majesty was pleased to discharge him from the Trouble of taking *Don Carlos* under his Care, and required no more at his Hands than to convoy the *Spanish* Troops to *Italy*, in Conjunction with his own Admiral. The combin'd Fleet accordingly set Sail from *Barcelona* in *October* 1731. and arrived at *Leghorn* the 26th of that Month.

As soon as the Court of *Spain* received Intelligence that their Forces were safely landed, and that * every Thing, relating to the Introduction of Spanish Garrisons in *Tuscany*, was finished, the young Prince was sent after them by Land, as far as *Antibes* ; for They chose to let Him travel thro' *France*, rather than accept of those magnificent Accommodations, which had been provided for Him and his Retinue, on Board our Squadron, at so great an Expence. His Highness arrived at † *Leghorn* the 27th of *Dec.* following, and was received there with all possible Marks of Joy and Respect ; especially by the *English* Factory, who erected a triumphal Arch in Honour of the Day. Soon after This, his Majesty received a Letter from the Dutchess Dowager of *Parma*, Guardian to *Don Carlos*, wherein ‡ she acquaints his Majesty with the due and happy Accomplishment of that Succession,

* See the *London Gazettes* for the Month of *Nov.* 1731.
 † *Ib.* Jan. 1. 1731-2. ‡ See the *publick Papers* of the same Date.

sion, desiring his Majesty's Acceptance of a † MEDAL struck upon this Occasion, and expressing her Sense of his Majesty's Friendship to the Royal Infant Duke as well as to Himself; and of the great Share that his Majesty hath had in this IMPORTANT EVENT.

About the same Time, Admiral *Wager* received a Present of the King of *Spain's* Picture set with Diamonds, to a great Value, for his Services in that glorious Expedition.

Don Carlos being thus established in his new Dominions, to the Satisfaction of their *Catholick Majesties*, at our Expence, the ministerial Writers began to raise their Crests again, and promised us all that our Hearts could wish from the Court of *Spain*, in Return for such high Obligations.—— But before I proceed to the Effects of these Transactions, I must make a few Remarks on another Article of the *Vienna Treaty*.

For as the *Emperor* consented to this Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Tuscany* and *Parma*, which he seem'd so resolutely determin'd to oppose with all his Might but a Year before, it must be concluded, that He likewise obtained some favorite Point for Himself; and That was our *Guaranty of the PRAGMATICK SANCTION*; the very Point, which was mark'd out and foretold by the *Country Writers*, as the only Term, upon which We should be able to purchase the Accession of his *Imperial Majesty* to the Treaty of *Seville*. This was just hinted at before; but I must now beg Leave to cite the Passage
at

† It was said that this Medal contain'd the Effigies of *Don Carlos* on one Side, with this Inscription, *Carolus I. Borbonius-Parnefius, novus. Dux Parmæ & Placentiæ*; and on the Reverse, a royal Crown upon a Carpet, with this Device, *Mox veniet*.

at large, with the *Author's* Sentiments upon *such an Expedient*.

† ' But it will be said, perhaps, that We are brought into no Danger of a War with the *Emperor*; that our *wise Ministers* have a Reserve still in their Power, and can make a Peace with his *Imperial Majesty*, whenever They please; that to effect it, nothing more will be necessary than to give our *Guaranty* to the Disposition, whatever it be, which his Imperial Majesty hath made, or shall make of the *Austrian Dominions*.

' Such an *Expedient* as This would, I doubt not, be soon pass'd (if the immediate Danger of a *War* press'd upon us) by *Those* who think of nothing more than how to get over, by *annual Expedients*, the *annual Difficulties* They bring Themselves under; without any Regard to the continual Charge and frequent Losses, which the Nation is obliged to support, by their Management, or to the dangerous Consequences of their Measures. But Men, who think on wiser and honest Principles, would look on *such a Guaranty* as a Method of Cure very little preferable to the Disease it self.

' His *Imperial Majesty* hath indeed given his *Guaranty* to the Succession of our Crown, establish'd in the present Royal Family; but there would be no Parity between *such a Guaranty* as This, and the *Guaranty of a Succession*, the Nature of which may be known by the *Pragmatick Sanctions*, but the Descent of which into any particular Family cannot be foreseen.

' Who could answer, in this Case, that We might not give our *Guaranty* even to the aggrandizing of *Don Carlos*, which is an Event our *Politicians* have express'd

‘ exprefs’d their Apprehensions of in the strongest
 ‘ Terms, although They seem at present a little bet-
 ‘ ter reconciled to it ?

‘ Who could foresee the numberless Mischiefs, of
 ‘ which such a Disposition of the *Austrian Dominions*
 ‘ might be productive, if his *Imperial Majesty* should
 ‘ die without *Issue male* ? What Clashing of Interests
 ‘ might there not be, even in the *Imperial Family*,
 ‘ as well as in every Part of the *Empire* ? To get
 ‘ clear of a War with *Spain*, We expose our selves
 ‘ to a War which may commence in *Italy*, and
 ‘ spread much farther. By the *Expedient* now suppo-
 ‘ sed, We might get clear of an immediate War in
 ‘ *Italy* ; but We should stand in Danger of being in-
 ‘ volved, a little sooner, or a little later, in a War
 ‘ which may distract *Germany* as much, and last as
 ‘ long as That of 1618. and kindle its Fires all over
 ‘ *Europe*.

The *Author of the Enquiry* reason’d, upon the same
 Principles, against our *Guaranty of the Pragmatick*
Sanction, about two Years before, and applauded his
 late Majesty’s Wisdom for refusing it, in the follow-
 ing Words. ‘ Certainly, no one can think but that
 ‘ it was wisely and happily judg’d to refuse a *Gua-*
 ‘ *ranty* which might have been attended with so fa-
 ‘ tal Consequences ; for as the *Emperor’s* Children are
 ‘ now *Females* only, and the Influence of that Suc-
 ‘ ccess upon *Europe* must depend upon the Marriages
 ‘ of these *Females* ; and as no one then knew to what
 ‘ *Princes* they might be hereafter married, it was
 ‘ wise in his Majesty, not to oblige himself to sup-
 ‘ port a *Succession*, which might possibly, by some fu-
 ‘ ture Marriages, become formidable to the rest of
 ‘ *Europe*, and fatal in the End to *Britain* itself.

This was the Language of the Court, and the Do-
 ctrine of the *Enquiry*, at the Beginning of the Year

1727. in order to justify the Treaty of *Hanover*, and the Measures that had been taken against the Allies of *Vienna*. I must therefore beg Leave to recommend one Consideration to the *Author of that memorable Treatise*; who seem'd to be very angry, about five Years ago, with an Observation, * *that he had been given up, in every material Article, by BOTH PARTIES, and complain'd of it as groundless.* This Complaint, among other Reasons, produced a † Reply from the *Gentleman* who made the *Observation*; and it was generally thought, that he supported it very fully, by an Induction of Particulars, as to the *main Points* then in Dispute; I mean, the several Articles of the *secret offensive Treaty of Vienna*, which was so strongly asserted in the *Enquiry*; for it did not then enter into any Body's Imagination, that We should ever consent to the *Introduction of SPANISH GARRISONS into Italy*, or become *Guaranties of the PRAGMATIC SANCTION*. But since the *Vicissitude of human Affairs*, the *Fluctuation of Power*, and the *Revolution of Politicks*, have brought these Things to pass, I leave the *Gentleman* to determine, in his own Breast, whether He is not now effectually given up in every material Article, which he either asserted, or justify'd in that Book. I am willing to believe Him a Man of great Sincerity, and that he was led into Error merely through *Misinformation*; but since his Book was set forth by Authority, as a Sort of *political Canon*, which the People were to receive for their *Rule of Faith*, and hath been made the Foundation of all our Disputes, for several Years together, it certainly behoves him to review it once more, and compare it with our *late Measures*, as becomes a *candid Writer*

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and

and a Lover of Truth.—But This is only by Way of Digression. Let us now proceed to other Matters, according to the Method laid down.

It must be confess'd, that *this Treaty of Vienna* prevented an *immediate War*, and served to keep Things together for some Time; but it was far from establishing a *firm and lasting Peace*; for, to speak in the softest Terms, there hath been a remarkable Coldness between *Us* and *France* ever since; and the Preparations in the Ports of *Spain* for equipping another *Armament*, the very next Spring, seem'd to give our *Ministers* such an Alarm, that a *Fleet* was fitted out here likewise in a great Hurry, and rendezvouz'd at the *Nore*, where it continued for some Time, under the Command of Sir *George Walton*. This, I say, seem'd to intimate that our Court had some Jealousy of the Design of the *Spaniards*; for as soon as certain Intelligence arrived, that they were landed near *Oran*, the *Admiral* was ordered to strike his Flag, and the Ships return'd to their Harbours.

Immediately after This, the *ministerial Press* was deliver'd of another Pamphlet, intitl'd, * *the natural Probability of a lasting Peace in Europe*; from whence it is necessary to quote a few Passages.

He begins with telling us, that † 'We enjoy at present the *most perfect, universal and established Tranquillity*. We behold not only *Great Britain* at Peace, and on the most amicable Terms, with *all her Neighbours*, but all her Neighbours are at the same Time disposed in, the strongest Manner, to live well with each other. We are not only happy in a good Understanding with other *Nations*, but those *Nations* likewise are without Quarrels and Disputes among
Them-

Themselves; so that as we have no Prospect of War, or Contention, by *Differences of our own*, neither are We likely to be drawn into Danger by the *Disagreements, the Ruptures, or Commotions of others.*

This, one would think, was sufficient in all Conscience; but He explains our Happiness more particularly in the next Paragraph.

This most advantageous Situation, *says He*, is what We have very seldom seen, what We hope will long continue, and what We conceive to be secured by the *most effectual, the best contrived Means in the World.* We cannot look back to any particular Period, within a long Course of Time, when *Europe* was blest with *such universal Quiet*, and with such reasonable Hopes of its *long extended Duration.* Almost every Peace that hath been made in *Europe*, since the Restoration of *Charles II.* seems to have been in its Nature, as well as in its Consequence, no better than a *short Cessation of Arms*; and whoever looks into the *Treaties*, which were designed to compose the *Quarrels of Princes* then at Variance, may easily see their *Differences* far from being *finished*, and *those unfinished Differences* big with *new Calamities.* But We have now the Happiness to see the *PLAN of POWER* so well design'd, the *Limits* so well bounded, and so strongly fenc'd, the several *Princes of Europe* so well satisfy'd with their *respective Conditions*, so powerfully disposed to *live peaceably within Themselves*, and so very far from being either interested, or inclined to make *Encroachments on their Neighbours*, that We may indulge all those Pleasures which good Minds are capable of conceiving on so agreeable a Prospect; since no Season ever beheld a Peace more universal, nor did any Conjunction of Affairs,

' Affairs ever promise a *Peace more established and lasting.*

Some Remarks upon this *Piece* were immediately published in the * *Craftsman*; particularly on the NEW PLAN OF POWER, so highly extoll'd in the foregoing Parâgraph.

This Writer profess'd Himself ready to acknowledge, that ' almost every Peace since the Restoration (and especially for SEVERAL YEARS PAST) seems ' to have been in its Nature, as well as in its Con- ' sequence, no better than a SHORT CESSATION OF ' ARMS.' He likewise confess'd, that the PLAN OF ' POWER in *Europe*, was certainly altered by two ' fundamental Articles of our late *Treaties*, viz. the ' Introduction of *Don Carlos* into *Italy*, and the Gua- ' ranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*.' But He was very far from agreeing with *this Reasoner upon Probabilities*, that it had laid the Foundation of an *universal and established Peace*; since it was well known that the Court of *France* was so far from discovering any Disposition to guaranty the *Pragmatick Sanction*, that it was undoubtedly their Interest to oppose it; that They had actually opposed it already, as far as They could do in the Way of *Negotiation*; and that, in all *Probability*, They would oppose it by *Force*, whenever the Contingency should happen.——He likewise express'd the same Apprehension from the new Settlement of *Don Carlos*, with Regard to the *Tranquillity of Europe*, and ask'd the following remarkable Questions upon it. ' May not the ITALI- ' AN DOMINIONS furnish a Bone of Contention be- ' tween *Germany* and *Spain*, in Times to come, as ' *Flanders* hath already done between *France* and the
States

' *States General*? May not these *Pretensions* prove the
' Means of uniting *France* and *Spain*, and involve
' *Great Britain* in a War to support her Engage-
' ments.

The Court Author beforementioned, (That is, Mr. *Walsingham*) was pleased to give these Questions a Reply in his next * *Free Briton*, and treated it as a ridiculous Supposition, ' that *France* and *Spain* should ' join in Arms against the *Pragmatick Sanction*. The ' Interests of *France* and *Spain* (says He) are so far ' incompatible, in this Affair, that the *Pope* and the ' *Turk* might as well be expected to join in a War ' for the utter Subversion of the *Protestant Religion*.

He adds, by Way of Interrogation, ' † if the ' Crown of *Spain* had any Claims, any Demands, ' upon the *Emperor* in *Italy*, can it be thought that ' This would unite the *French* and *Spaniards* toge- ' ther? — Would the Court of *France* think it ' worth their Trouble even to take away Power from ' the House of *Austria*, if it were merely to add to ' the *Spanish* Power? Or, are not the *French* and ' *Spaniards* naturally as jealous of each other, as either ' of Them can be of the House of *Austria*? — And ' can it then be thought that They will ever UNITE, ' when their Interests always must be different?

What an excellent Head must this Man have to reason upon *Probabilities*, and judge of future *Contingencies*, who seems altogether ignorant of actual *Events*? For it was visible to every Body of common Discernment, that an *Union* between *France* and *Spain* was very far advanced even at the Time when He published this Song of *Triumph*; and indeed had been growing up ever since the Treaty of *Seville*, which

which naturally produced it, as the *Country Writers* justly observed, by dissolving the Alliance between *Spain* and the *Emperor*. He likewise seems to have forgot a certain Observation of his old Acquaintance, ROGER MANLEY Esq; some Years before, concerning the QUEEN of SPAIN, viz. ‘* that as she is ‘ a Princess of SPIRIT and AMBITION, she carried her ‘ Views yet farther, being very desirous to make her ‘ SON sole Monarch of LOMBARDY.’ Now, if This is the true Character of her *Catholick Majesty*, let me ask our profound Politician, whether paving the Way for *Don Carlos*, so far as we have done, could possibly have any natural Tendency to check her Ambition; or whether she could take a more probable Method of gratifying her farther Views, than by uniting with FRANCE on a proper Opportunity? — But I am ashamed to comment any farther on a Piece which appeared absurd enough of itself when it was first published, and hath been lately ridicul’d in so † handsome a Manner. I shall therefore close this Head with an Observation or two, which naturally result from the State of the Case.

The precedent Transactions are sufficient to teach us how necessary it is for *Ministers and Governors of Kingdoms*, which have any main Interest at Stake, or any great Point at Heart, to keep it constantly in View, and to pursue it with inflexible Resolution. By these Means, We see, the Court of *Spain* hath at length effectuated the Succession of *Don Carlos* to the *Tuscan Dominions*, through infinite Obstacles; and, if We may believe the ministerial Writers, against the Interests and Inclinations of all the Powers in *Europe*. By the same Means his *Imperial Majesty* hath, in a Manner,

* *British Journal*, January 4. 1728-9.

† *Fog's Journal*, December 22. 1733.

Manner, extorted our *Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction*, which his late and his present Majesty thought fit to refuse so long. I sincerely wish, that I had any Opportunity of congratulating my own Country on the same happy Issue of our Negotiations, with Respect to those *essential Points* about which We have been contending for so many Years, and at so much Expence; but though the same Assiduity hath, no Doubt, been employed, and the same constant invariable Regard hath been paid to our *Interests*, it does not yet appear, that they have been crown'd with the same Success. It is true, indeed, that his *Imperial Majesty* hath at length consented to abolish the *Ostend Company*, and all Trade to the *East Indies* from the *Austrian Netherlands*; but this hath been confess'd, on *both Sides*, to be the *least material Article* with Regard to *Us*; and every Body knows, that it might have been effectually suppress'd at first, for a Trifle not worth mentioning, in Comparison to those immense Sums which it hath since cost us. Besides, I observed before, that the Bustle We have made about *this Trade* hath set almost every Nation upon Schemes of the *same Kind*; and that even the *Emperor* Himself is now pursuing a Plan for carrying it on in some other Part of the World not prohibited by *Treaty*. Our *principal Points* therefore are, the undisturb'd Possession of *Gibraltar* and the Island of *Minorca*, the Freedom of *Commerce*, and Reparation to our *plunder'd Merchants*. As to the *first*, I cannot possibly conceive how our *Right to the Possession of these Places* can be said to be effectually ascertain'd and secur'd, when the very *Treaty*, upon which the *Spaniards* ground their *Pretensions* to them, is recall'd and confirm'd in all the *subsequent Treaties*, by which We are told they have renounc'd *those Pretensions*; especially when it is farther considered, that They

have

have constantly refused to renounce Them *specifically*, and have even given us the most ocular Demonstration of their Intentions, by erecting *Forts* and other *military Works* to annoy our Garrison, as well as our Ships in the Bay. The *Freedom of Commerce* and *Reparation to our Merchants* are so closely interwoven together, that they may be properly consider'd under *one Head*; and what hath been done upon This? Why, the Time limited by the Treaty of *Seville*, for the Examination and Decision of *that Affair*, expired, without any Thing being settled. Another Term of *three Years* was then agreed upon; above *one Year* of which is already elapsed, and I do not hear that the *Merchants* have yet received any Satisfaction. But as the *Commissaries* on our Part are now return'd, and the *Parliament* is just upon the Point of meeting, We shall soon know what they have done; and I heartily wish that a *certain Gentleman's* Prediction in the House of Commons, when the Treaty of *Seville* came first under Deliberation there, may not be verifi'd, *viz. that the Execution of this Commission would cost the Nation more than the Merchants would ever get by it.* — If therefore We have not effectually insisted on either of these *great Points*, whilst the *dearest Interest* of *Spain* remain'd in Suspence, and must have remain'd so without our Assistance, how can We expect to obtain them, when We have given *that Pledge* out of our own Hands, and *Spain* stands no longer in Need of Us?

But it will be said, perhaps, (nay, it hath been said in Effect already) that We could not purchase *Peace* at too dear a Rate, as our Circumstances then stood; and that We had better yield to any Terms, than plunge the Nation into a *War*. If This was
our

our Case, I should be glad to know why the same Considerations did not prevail long before; for, if We had undertaken to effectuate the Introduction of *Don Carlos*, with *Spanish* Garrisons into *Italy*, at the Congress of *Cambray*, instead of opposing it with so much Vigour, the Court of *Spain* would have had no Occasion to throw themselves into the Arms of the *Emperor*; and if we had been happy enough, at the same Time, to discover, that the *Guaranty* of the *Pragmatick Sanction* was only a Bugbear that frighten'd us without any Reason, there is no Room to suppose that the *Emperor* would not have comply'd with the Demands of the *Spaniards*, upon that Condition, as readily as He hath done since. In this Case, I say, *Great Britain* would not only have saved an infinite Expence in sending out so many naval Armaments to all Parts of the World, keeping up foreign Armies, and paying foreign Subsidies, with all their necessary Concomitants at home, but might likewise have carried on her Commerce without Interruption, or such a continued Series of Depredations as our Merchants have suffer'd for many Years past. Nay, if our Ministers had happen'd to make all these wise Discoveries at the Congress of *Soissons*, or even when the Treaty of *Seville* was in Agitation, We might have avoided some Part of these Expences and Calamities; for it is directly said in the Answer to the Imperial Decree against that Treaty, published at *Ratisbon*, and said to be written by the French Minister, ' * that the Court of *Vienna* did, in some Measure, put the Allies of *Hanover* in the Way of the Negotiation, which now fills Them with Indignation

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'tion and Resentment; and that nothing hath been
'done, but what the *Emperor* was very ready to do
'Himself, had CERTAIN CONDITIONS essential to the
'Interests of HIS HOUSE been comply'd with.

But our greatest Misfortune is, that the very *Measures* We chose to take for obtaining a *lasting Peace*, are likely to involve us in a *general War*; and, what is still worse, after we have spent so many *Millions of Money*, suffered so many grievous Losses in our *Trade*, and made such *large Concessions*, in order to avoid it. This is what the *Country Party* have long ago foretold, and I am heartily sorry to find their Predictions so nearly accomplished; for it appears very plainly, from the foregoing Deduction, to what Causes the present Commotions in *Europe* are really owing, I mean, to the Treaty of *Seville*, which opened a Way for the *Spaniards* into *Italy*, and to the last Treaty of *Vienna*, which compleated the Union between *France* and *Spain*, as the *other* laid a Foundation for it, by separating *Spain* from the *Emperor*.

How ridiculous therefore is it to argue, as *some Men do*, that the present War in *Europe* was occasioned meerly by the accidental Death of the late King of *Poland*, which *no human Wisdom could foresee*? It may be said, indeed, that the Demise of *that Prince* was the immediate Occasion of the Flame's bursting out; but the combustible Matter was laid long before, and the least Spark was sufficient to set Fire to the Train. The Vacancy of the Throne of *Poland* happened to come first in the Way, but any other Accident in *Europe* would have had just the same Effect.

The Court of *Vienna* was so far from imputing the present War to the Death of *Augustus*, that They represented

presented the ‘* *Polish Election* as an Handle only
 ‘ for putting *those Designs* in Execution, which *France*
 ‘ had meditated long before the Throne of *Poland*
 ‘ became vacant.

Besides, it ought to be considered, that although
 the particular Year, Month, or Day, on which King
Augustus would die, could not be foreseen; yet it is
 well known that He was *above threescore Years of Age*,
 and in a *very infirm State of Health*. No wise People
 therefore would care to pay for an *Annuity of Peace*
upon such a Life; and We ought, at least, to have
 been secured against a *Contingency*, which could not
 be very far off, according to the ordinary Course of
 Nature. But *Contingencies* are Things which *some*
Men seem intirely to neglect. They consider only
 the *present Time*; and if They can but make a Shift
 to put off the Evil for a Day, They seldom take any
Thought for the Morrow.

I know it will be said, (as it hath been said be-
 fore, upon other Occasions) that * *the Judgment*
from the EVENT of Things merely is not the Judgment of
 REASON. I grant that it is not *merely* so; especial-
 ly when We speak of *fortuitous Events*, which God
 only can foresee; though the Court Party have often
 founded their Triumphs upon *such Accidents*; and I
 will venture to affirm, that no Men were ever more
 lucky in *that Particular*. But the *Events* We speak
 of, at present, are only such as flow from *natural*
Causes; in the Foresight of which all *political Wis-*
dom consists. I believe the Gentlemen on the Coun-
 try Side do not pretend to any *supérnatural Light*, or
 Gifts

* See the *Remarks on the Motives of the French King's Resolutions*.
 † *Defence of the Enquiry*, p. 35.

Gifts of Divination; and yet That must be the Case; if all the *Events*, which they have foretold, are merely *accidental*. If They had judg'd right upon *one* or *two Points* only, it might have been imputed to *Guess-work*, or *Chance*; but to be justified in their Opinion of publick Transactions, for seven or eight Years together, by the Consequences of them; in almost every Particular, is certainly owing to something more than a mere Run of *Luck*, and can proceed from nothing but a right Judgment of *Causes* and *Effects*.

But it may be said again, of what Use is it at present, to tell us that *one Set of Gentlemen* had more Sagacity and Foresight than *another*? The *Events* of our late Transactions are now visible to every Body; the Nation is in Danger; and *what is to be done*? This, indeed, is a proper Question; but the Answer is not so easy. Things seem to be brought to such a Pass, that I wish it may not puzzle the ablest Heads in *England* to extricate us, with Honour, out of that Labyrinth of *Engagements* in which We are unhappily involved.

We find ourselves oblig'd, by several *Treaties*, to assist the *Emperor*, if He should be attack'd; and it is said, that we have been already call'd upon to perform *these Engagements*.

By the *Treaty of Seville*, we are ty'd down, in the strongest Manner, to secure *Don Carlos* in the Possession of his *Italian Dominions* for ever, against all *EVENTS*. His *Catholick Majesty* alludes very plainly to *this Engagement* in his late *complaisant Memorial* to the King of *Great Britain*; where He acknowledges the *generous Part*, which his Majesty hath acted with *Regard to Don Carlos*.

And

And if it should be true, as a Rumour flies about, that the Plan of Operations, which the *French* are now pursuing in *Italy*, was first chalk'd out by Us, in Case the *Emperor* should not make good his Engagements to *Spain*; what Part can We possibly take in *these Disputes*, without wounding our Honour, or betraying our Interest?

If it should be likewise true, as I have heard it whisper'd, that We promis'd *France* our Assistance, about *four Years ago*, to restore King *Stanislaus* to the Throne of *Poland*, whenever *Augustus* should die, and that our *Minister* was even order'd to co-operate with the *French Minister* for that Purpose; if This, I say, is true, and We should have since given the *Emperor* any Encouragement to oppose the Election of *that Prince*, how are We to act upon the present Occasion?

In short, which ever Way We turn ourselves, or whatever Side We take, if We take any, We shall not only involve ourselves in a dangerous and expensive War, but likewise incur the Reproach and Resentment of *one Side* or the *other*, since *both* of Them think Themselves intitled to our Assistance.

If, to avoid these Difficulties, We choose a State of *absolute Neutrality*, and leave the *opposite Powers* to dispute their own Quarrel among Themselves, the Consequence may be fatal to *Europe*, and at length involve Us in the common Calamity.

The Question therefore recurs, *what is to be done?* Or is any Thing to be done? — Ought we to involve ourselves in a *War*, in which We have *no particular Interest* concern'd? — Or shall We sit down in Quiet, and run the Hazard of seeing *Europe* become a Prey to the Arms of the *Conqueror*? — For my Part, I cannot pretend to answer these Questions;

ons; and the present Situation of Affairs is surrounded with so many Difficulties on every Side, that I believe the wisest Man in *England*, as I said before, would be at a Loss to judge what is most expedient in *such a Crisis*. But one Thing seems to be very obvious; that *those Persons*, who have intangled us in the *present Difficulties*, are the most unlikely to work us out of them again; for how can *They* speak to *foreign Courts* with that Dignity and Authority which are necessary upon such an Occasion, when *They* have already dealt with every one of *Them*, and disoblig'd *Them* all in their Turns? It is not therefore surprizing to hear *such Men* crying out for Help, or to see *Them* ready to catch at any Hint, in order to justify their future Measures by the Sentiments and Characters of *Those* whom *They* affect to despise.

When the Ship is really in Danger, all Hands must be at Work; and every Man will naturally endeavour, for his own Sake, to prevent her sinking; but, in the present Cases it is necessary to know our *whole Danger*, before any Gentleman will venture to give his Opinion upon it. There may be many more *secret Engagements*, or *Transactions*, than have yet come to our Knowledge; and how can any Body pretend to determine what Measures are most proper to be taken, till the *whole State of Affairs* is fully explain'd?

The *ministerial Writers* will cavil, perhaps, at this Conduct of the *Country Party*, and represent it as the Effect of a Resolution not to give the Government any Assistance, in Time of Danger, unless the Management of Affairs is put into their own Hands; but surely nothing can be more ridiculous than such an Imputation in our *present Circumstances*. Men
must

must be quite drunk, and even mad with the Lust of Power, to covet it on such *Terms*; and therefore, if any of Them should be induced to undertake the publick Service, it ought to be imputed to their Zeal for his *Majesty's Honour*, and a generous Design of rescuing their *Country* out of its *present Difficulties*.——But I have done; and should not have made even these short Remarks, had I not accidentally met with a * *Pamphlet* just published; in which the *Author* discovers all the Marks of *Timidity*, under the Disguise of *blustering Language*, and exhibits to us the ridiculous Image of *natural Insolence* struggling with *Consciousness of Guilt*.

What I propos'd, was, to state our Case as I found it, with Regard to *foreign Affairs*; and to point out the several Gradations by which We have been drawn into it. How We are to be extricated out of it, is beyond my Province, and must be referr'd to the Wisdom of *Parliament*.

I design'd, indeed, to have added a State of our *domestick Affairs*, which have kept an equal Pace with *Those abroad*, as I am ready to prove by *Accounts* now lying before me; but these Sheets being already swell'd to a much larger Compass than I propos'd at first, the *second Part* must be reserv'd for another Opportunity.

However, there is *one Point* which requires immediate Consideration, under our *present unhappy Circumstances*, and therefore must not be intirely pass'd over in Silence; I mean the *NAVY DEBT*, which is now calculated at near *Two Millions*, and hath been chiefly contracted since the Year 1722.

This

* *A Letter to the Craftsmen, printed for Roberts.*

This Debt arises by the modern Practice of exceeding the annual Sum granted and appropriated by Parliament for the Service of the *Navy*, in order to keep up a larger Body of *Land Forces*, and at the same Time perswade unwary People that the *current Expences of the Year* are kept within due Bounds; whereas, in Truth, We are every Year running in Debt upon that Account; for the Service of the *Navy* being justly more popular than that of the *Army*, it is natural for *Ministers*, who have private Reasons for not raising the *whole Supplies* within the Year, to cloak all *Deficiencies* under the most *favorite Head*. But this Practice is of very mischievous Consequence to the Publick, and hath often been complain'd of as such in *Parliament*, as well as from the *Throne*, though hitherto without Redress.

At the latter End of *Queen Anne's* Reign, the Parliament represented to her Majesty, 'that increasing the *annual Expences* beyond the Supplies granted is an *illegal Practice*; a dangerous Invasion of the *Rights of Parliament*; and an Attempt, which differs very little from *levying Money without Consent of Parliament*.'——I choose to quote these Passages from the *Representation* at that Time, because they seem to have had so much Weight with a *certain honourable Gentleman*, that I find them transcribed into his own *Observations on the Navy Debt*, in the Year 1711.

At the opening of the Parliament in *Oct. 1721*. (soon after *this Gentleman* came into Power) the late King observed to Them, 'that They could not but be sensible of the ill Consequences which arise from such a large Debt unprovided for; that as long as the *Navy* and *victualling Bills* are at a very high *Discount*, they do not only affect all other
publick

' *publick Credit*, but increase the Charge and Expence
' of the *current Service*.'—He farther observes,
' that *this Debt*, of all others, is the most heavy and
' burdensom.

The present great Debt of the *Navy* is therefore
a Subject which seems to require immediate Con-
sideration ; and it is hoped that an effectual Stop
will be put to such Practices for the future.

Neither would it be altogether improper to make
some Enquiries into the present State of our *Shipping*,
the Condition of our *Stores*, and the Reasons of that
deplorable Desertion of our *Seamen*, which, if not
speedily prevented, will render even our *Fleet* it self
of but little Use.

All These are Points which certainly deserve the
Attention of a *British Parliament* ; especially at a
Time when *Europe* is threaten'd with a general
War, and our *Navy* at least ought to be put under
the best Regulations.

Before I conclude, let me just mention another
Practice of the most dangerous Consequence to a
free State ; and That is, the Method of granting
Money without Limitation, Appropriation, or even
so much as specifying the Services to be perform'd.
This is commonly, and indeed not improperly, cal-
led a *Vote of Credit* ; since it reposes an absolute
Confidence in the *King* and his *Ministers* to act at
Discretion, and make what Demands They please
upon the People. I say, therefore, that is a most dan-
gerous Power, and may be made use of to destroy the
very Being of *Parliaments*, by depositing the *Purse*
of the Nation in the Hands of the Crown, without
any *Restriction* or *Account* ; for though *Ministers*
are always ready to promise *Accounts*, when They
are pleading for such *unlimited Grants*, yet they

are constantly deny'd, when called for, as the *Journals of Parliament* abundantly testify; and This is one good Reason for suspecting the Use of them.

On the other Hand, all the Arguments advanc'd in Favour of *these Grants*, such as *sudden Exigences*, *unforeseen Accidents*, and *secret Service*, are meer Fallacies, to say no worse of them, and may be urged with the same Force at all Times, and by every Minister, without any Discrimination.

As to the personal Character of the *Prince*, it hath nothing to do in this Case, nor ought it to be introduc'd upon such an Occasion; for every Body knows that Concessions to a *good King* are always made Precedents for the same Complaisance to a *bad one*; and indeed, who will presume to make the Distinction? Besides, the Character of the *best Prince*, that ever wore a Crown, ought not to be put in Competition with the *Privilege of Parliament*, and the *Liberties of a whole People*.

But if *Votes of Credit* are dangerous at all Times, They are peculiarly so just before a GENERAL ELECTION, when they may be employ'd to corrupt the *People* with their own Money, and destroy the Freedom of *that House* from whence They receive their Force.

Whoever reads the *Memoirs of Philip de Commines*, will see that the Subjects of *Charles Duke of Burgundy* lost their Liberties by a *Power of the same Nature*, which that Prince artfully gain'd, under Pretence of keeping Himself always prepared against any sudden Surprizes from his Neighbour the King of *France*: And one great Blow was given to the Liberties of *France* itself, by the like Concessions to *Lewis the Eleventh*.

But

But the most remarkable Instance of the bad Consequences of such extraordinary Grants is recorded by Dr. Geddes, who tells us, that † Henry II. King of Castile, being resolved on a War with the Moorish King of Granada, in the Year 1406. demanded a large Supply of the Cortes for carrying it on; but the Cortes judging the Sum too great for the People to pay, absolutely refused to grant more than one Third of what the King demanded; and when no Importunities could prevail upon Them to alter their Resolution, The King gave his Assent to the Bill which They had pass'd for that Purpose; 'but, at the same Time, desired that in Case the Sum, which they had given, should be found not to be sufficient, They would empower Him, without assembling the Cortes, which would require Time, to raise Money upon the Subject, to supply that Deficiency.

Dr. Geddes observes, 'that although the giving the King such a Power, was fiercely opposed by 2 great many Procurators, as a Thing that struck at the very Root of the Authority of a Cortes, it was carried by a Majority; and though it was granted only for a Year, yet that was enough to create such a Precedent, as would encourage their future Kings to desire to have the same Power, and to take it very ill if it were denied Them; and by such WEAK OR CORRUPT CONCESSIONS as These, it was, that the Spanish Cortes's came to lose all their Authority.

† Geddes's Tracts, Vol. I. p. 331.

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